Times of terror
Sep 27th 2007 | BERLIN
From The Economist print edition
Trying to cope with future threats but burdened by the past
THE German people have been spared a direct attack by Islamist terrorists. But the interior minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, himself a victim of an assassination attempt, has raised fears by saying that a nuclear attack by terrorists is only a matter of time. Franz Josef Jung, the defence minister, has added that, if terrorists used a passenger plane as a missile, he would have it shot down, contradicting a ruling by the constitutional court. Among those denouncing the two Christian Democratic ministers as scaremongers are their coalition partners, the Social Democrats. Mr Jung crossed a “demarcation line”, said the vice-chancellor, Franz Müntefering.
In Germany, the debate over the trade-off between security and liberty has two twists. The first, which may be healthy, is that it is being conducted within the tense “grand coalition” government, in which both sides of the argument are represented. The second, which is less so, is Germany's 60-year tradition of deep mistrust of the state. Other countries also face trade-offs; Germany is grappling with its historical taboos as well.
The constitutional court's overturning last year of parts of a “flight security law” simply reflects German legal doctrine. The duty to respect human dignity is absolute, so the state may not kill some to protect others, said the court. Nor may it deploy the armed forces at home except to repel foreign attacks or deal with catastrophes. Since soldiers cannot disobey the law, Mr Jung can have no confidence that the air force would shoot down a plane if he gave the order.
In fact, even the most zealous defenders of the court's ruling consider it impracticable. The argument is over whether Mr Jung should have said as much; and whether, as he insists, a new law is needed to sanction the shooting down of a passenger aircraft. His critics say he is playing politics with a remote possibility. If such a hijacking ever happened, it might be impossible to confirm the hijackers' intent in time to down the plane. But in such a situation, few doubt that the defence minister would give the order. “In that case it is wise to act and not to publish ideas and thoughts in advance,” comments Michael Hartmann, the Social Democratic spokesman for internal security.
The constitutional court may even agree. It avoided saying that any minister who issues a shoot-down order would be subject to criminal prosecution, notes Dietrich Murswiek, director of the Institute of Public Law at Freiburg University.
What Mr Jung and Mr Schäuble are really trying to do, their critics fear, is to replace Germany's “legal state” with a “preventive state”. Mr Schäuble, the supposed ringleader, sees the distinction between foreign and domestic security as false and is given to provocative suggestions (perhaps known terrorists should be targeted for assassination, he mused recently). His security wish-list includes such controversial proposals as letting the security services install spy software on suspects' computers. Although Mr Hartmann supports on-line snooping, he worries that “step by step Germany could become an only security-oriented state.”
Despite these disputes Germany is updating its anti-terrorism laws. The grand coalition has passed 13 measures, such as authorising police and the secret services to share data on terrorist suspects. The spat over Messrs Jung and Schäuble's remarks has not stopped the government from negotiating over new laws to expand the powers of the federal police. The difference, says Mr Hartmann, is that “now we don't smile when we see each other.”
2007年9月28日星期五
Aviation in China
Dog fight
Sep 27th 2007 | HONG KONG
From The Economist print edition
A fight in Shanghai between two airlines ends Chinese-style: mysteriously
CONTROL of the world's aviation hubs is so thoroughly locked up that the possibility one of them might be up for grabs is almost inconceivable. Hence the excitement when a fight broke out over access to Shanghai, before coming abruptly to a halt on September 24th.
It is hard to overstate Shanghai's attractiveness to airlines. The number of passengers handled by the city's two airports, Pudong and Hongqiao, has increased by more than 20% a year for five years, compared with single-digit growth at most of the world's big airports. Companies' operations in China require personal attention, so as business expands westward from the coastal cities, demand for easy access by air will only increase.
The dominant airline in Shanghai, with a market share of 37%, is China Eastern Airlines. Barely profitable, poorly managed and in need of investment, it has been in talks for more than a year with Singapore Airlines, one of the world's best airlines. China Eastern's share price began to move up sharply in May and nearly tripled during September on the announcement that Singapore Airlines would take a 15.7% share in the company and that Temasek, the Singaporean state-owned investment company, would purchase 8.3%. The deal, which would provide almost $1 billion for new investment, was approved by Chinese officials at cabinet level.
The prospect of a better managed, well-capitalised competitor sent a shudder through Air China, another government-controlled airline, which has a 20% market share in Shanghai. It also alarmed Air China's partner, Hong Kong's Cathay Pacific, which dominates the lucrative Hong Kong route through a subsidiary, Dragonair. Rumours abounded that Cathay was preparing to announce a rival bid for China Eastern. Both airlines' share prices shot up. On September 21st Cathay's shares were suspended pending an announcement about “a proposed transaction”. But instead Cathay Pacific said on September 24th that it had no plans to bid for China Eastern. It gave no reason, but political pressure from the Chinese government is believed to have scuppered its plans.
Passengers probably do not mind whether it is Singapore or Cathay that takes a stake in China Eastern—service is bound to improve either way. There is talk of some sort of a tie-up between China Southern, the third of China's big airlines, and Air France-KLM, which would also lead to improvements. But evidently the government's enthusiasm for genuine competition goes only so far. This week's pre-emption of a bidding war left no doubt about who in China controls not just the ground, but the skies too.
Sep 27th 2007 | HONG KONG
From The Economist print edition
A fight in Shanghai between two airlines ends Chinese-style: mysteriously
CONTROL of the world's aviation hubs is so thoroughly locked up that the possibility one of them might be up for grabs is almost inconceivable. Hence the excitement when a fight broke out over access to Shanghai, before coming abruptly to a halt on September 24th.
It is hard to overstate Shanghai's attractiveness to airlines. The number of passengers handled by the city's two airports, Pudong and Hongqiao, has increased by more than 20% a year for five years, compared with single-digit growth at most of the world's big airports. Companies' operations in China require personal attention, so as business expands westward from the coastal cities, demand for easy access by air will only increase.
The dominant airline in Shanghai, with a market share of 37%, is China Eastern Airlines. Barely profitable, poorly managed and in need of investment, it has been in talks for more than a year with Singapore Airlines, one of the world's best airlines. China Eastern's share price began to move up sharply in May and nearly tripled during September on the announcement that Singapore Airlines would take a 15.7% share in the company and that Temasek, the Singaporean state-owned investment company, would purchase 8.3%. The deal, which would provide almost $1 billion for new investment, was approved by Chinese officials at cabinet level.
The prospect of a better managed, well-capitalised competitor sent a shudder through Air China, another government-controlled airline, which has a 20% market share in Shanghai. It also alarmed Air China's partner, Hong Kong's Cathay Pacific, which dominates the lucrative Hong Kong route through a subsidiary, Dragonair. Rumours abounded that Cathay was preparing to announce a rival bid for China Eastern. Both airlines' share prices shot up. On September 21st Cathay's shares were suspended pending an announcement about “a proposed transaction”. But instead Cathay Pacific said on September 24th that it had no plans to bid for China Eastern. It gave no reason, but political pressure from the Chinese government is believed to have scuppered its plans.
Passengers probably do not mind whether it is Singapore or Cathay that takes a stake in China Eastern—service is bound to improve either way. There is talk of some sort of a tie-up between China Southern, the third of China's big airlines, and Air France-KLM, which would also lead to improvements. But evidently the government's enthusiasm for genuine competition goes only so far. This week's pre-emption of a bidding war left no doubt about who in China controls not just the ground, but the skies too.
老洋房里的内衣秀
英国《金融时报》中文网特约撰稿人范庭略
2007年9月28日 星期五
走进人家的私宅，坐在人家的客厅，看着人家的老婆在给你做饭，这是一位大陆美食家描写他第一次去一家香港私房菜吃饭时候的意乱神迷。俗话说老婆是人家的好，儿子是自己的好。私房菜看来也是人家老婆烧得更加好。
在香港的金融风暴之后，很多的私房菜馆在饮食管理严格的香港营运而生，最初的考虑都是因为自己的菜烧得好，又可以挣钱，但是一楼临街租金太贵，烟牌、酒牌很难在短期取得，除了食品卫生署的考察之外，还需要在报纸上刊登广告，主要是需要徵求街坊四邻的意见，于是很多人开始觉得在自己家里开一家餐厅应该不错，都是靠口碑来相传，几道拿手的小菜，再加上几瓶珍藏的红酒，想吃的就预订，没有客人就正常过日子，这种居家“阿庆嫂”显然是将成本和营收考虑得最好的经营者。不过最后可以将生意做大的，始终要从楼上搬下来，毕竟SOHO厨师还是营业额太低。而据本地的文史爱好者考证，上海最初的私房菜显然要比香港更加源远流长，这并不是金融风暴之后的事情，而是在有长三堂子盛行的旧上海，著名的当家花旦年底酬谢大客户，做几道小菜做为犒劳，当然那个时候不流行给大客户抽奖之类的尾牙聚会，最多就是《海上花》里面梁朝伟和李嘉欣那样吃几样小菜，温一温黄酒，然后希望来年继续多多捧场。不过私房菜做到最后就是消灭了原有的各类牌照，将利益最大化之后，依靠着几个老饕的轮流捧场，不断在工艺上推陈出新，有时候想想和大陆的农家菜或者什么毛豆阿姨之类的，颇有几分类似，不过真正上了名贵的燕鲍翅之后，显然就不好在家里继续SOHO了，于是做大做强的野心昭然若现。在今天中国的餐饮界哪个不想做小肥羊或者俏江南呢？除了可以挣现金之外，还可以上市圈钱，显然是利益最大化的好选择，既然是好的选择那么于公于私就不要太过于讲究了。
私房菜吃多了，但是私房内衣秀却还是第一次见到。所谓中国大牌子的“麦加”就是指上海的恒隆广场，如果在这里看不到阁下的品牌，不要说你是卢浮宫珍藏的，你就是少年宫珍藏的都没戏。于是在恒隆的周围聚集了众多渴望成为大牌或者显然就是大牌的水货聚集地。当然了，水货并不是说它是假货，只是它没有按照正常的手续进口，或者是商家自己安排买手去欧洲进货，但是并不在专卖地里面出现的产品。恒隆的周围众多老式里弄洋房里面散布着这样的小店，如果说恒隆或者中信泰富是城门的话，它们就是池鱼。也可以说它们是站在了巨人的肩膀上。在一个周五的傍晚，我很兴奋的参加了一次内衣私房秀的活动。首先大家坐在中信泰富楼下的星巴克里面碰头，于是各路人马开始聚集，因为大家都很好奇，这种所谓的一对一的内衣秀究竟会是如何呢？我倒是和朋友在纽约时代广场的附近看到过一对一的内衣秀，可惜不是在秀内衣，而是在秀舞娘的身材。事先召集人已经告诉大家，模特不多，货品很多。于是浮想联翩的安迪偷偷问我，难道真是一个模特儿对一群看客吗？在我们步入中信泰富对面的院子的时候，老式里弄洋房的幽静并不比陕西北路荣家老宅的规模相差太远。拾阶而上，一如上海众多老式住宅的昏暗，走廊上的几瓦小灯泡给我们一种神秘的意味，难道推开二楼这扇门真的会豁然开朗吗？答案倒是肯定的。那扇门打开之后，里面显然是另外的一种风情，完全是按照巴黎的设计风格重新装修的，甚至连天花都作了细部的处理，护墙板的颜色给你一种暧昧的呼唤，而最明显的水晶吊灯给我们一种比较正式的专卖店风格。厚厚的地毯踩在脚下，空调无声的开着，温度完全的降了下来。刚刚那种七十二家房客的老式里弄的感觉都被那扇大门给隔绝了。主人是一位精明能干的台湾姑娘，而她做为内衣的买手所经营的内衣显然是和淮海路上的古今系列有所不同。比较有趣的是今天除了召集人是女孩子之外，一水儿的放牛班全男生，反而开始有些不好意思。她把音乐打开，房间里面开始弥漫着HOTEL系列的音乐，在DJ台旁边的巧克力和红酒使得没有吃晚饭的朋友们减少了拘束。台湾姑娘开始询问大家给自己的女友是否需要送一件内衣或者睡衣等等。最紧张的时候到了：如果你们觉得好看，但是没有把握知道女友是否合适的话，我们的模特儿可以传给你看！这个时候，一位个头矮小但是某些部位还算丰满的姑娘出现在大家面前，她羞涩的笑着，希望我们选好了之后预订她的试穿。这些内衣都是她采购自欧洲的名牌内衣店，不乏恒隆里面的大牌子，但是也许是由于货品的问题，那些牌子显然还没有在中国推出它们的内衣产品。如果可以在这里买一件名牌内衣，倒是一个很好的选择。
专业的眼光来看这个姑娘似乎不是很适合做内衣模特儿，尽管我们都不是经纪公司的，但是看到姑娘胳膊上种植的牛痘以及估计本周蚊子新鲜来访的痕迹，感到近距离看一个内衣模特儿是不礼貌的。但是姑娘显然是习惯了客人的眼光，大方的进到里间去更换第一套的内衣。在迷幻的LOUNGE音乐的召唤下，内衣秀开始了。虽然没有追光灯，但是小小的房间里面，挤着七八个彬彬有礼的男性客户，模特儿从容的站在距离你不到10公分的地方，的确无论款式还是质地都可以看得清清楚楚。
显然这样的销售手法要比在柜台前面要求一个陌生顾客试试你的太太的尺码更加高明很多。估计很多男性客人都有过被各种热心大妈要求给她的儿子买衣服时候看看尺码的经历，但是我敢保证如果在一家内衣店里面去要求一位陌生的女客人为自己的女友试一试某杯的内衣，你先要确定对方是否也是同样尺码，这的确有些勉为其难。这种有容乃大的要求在这种内衣私房秀里面完全得到了解决。同来的客人还没有选好，门铃响了，第二批接踵而至，显然生意还是很不错。在我们离开的时候，我偷偷的问安迪，你为什么不给你的女朋友买一件呢？他笑着告诉我，他觉得内衣和鞋子一样，还是让她们自己来买比较好。另外他买的内衣都是用来撕的，显然这种两三千人民币的内衣，他的确有些不忍心下手。
2007年9月28日 星期五
走进人家的私宅，坐在人家的客厅，看着人家的老婆在给你做饭，这是一位大陆美食家描写他第一次去一家香港私房菜吃饭时候的意乱神迷。俗话说老婆是人家的好，儿子是自己的好。私房菜看来也是人家老婆烧得更加好。
在香港的金融风暴之后，很多的私房菜馆在饮食管理严格的香港营运而生，最初的考虑都是因为自己的菜烧得好，又可以挣钱，但是一楼临街租金太贵，烟牌、酒牌很难在短期取得，除了食品卫生署的考察之外，还需要在报纸上刊登广告，主要是需要徵求街坊四邻的意见，于是很多人开始觉得在自己家里开一家餐厅应该不错，都是靠口碑来相传，几道拿手的小菜，再加上几瓶珍藏的红酒，想吃的就预订，没有客人就正常过日子，这种居家“阿庆嫂”显然是将成本和营收考虑得最好的经营者。不过最后可以将生意做大的，始终要从楼上搬下来，毕竟SOHO厨师还是营业额太低。而据本地的文史爱好者考证，上海最初的私房菜显然要比香港更加源远流长，这并不是金融风暴之后的事情，而是在有长三堂子盛行的旧上海，著名的当家花旦年底酬谢大客户，做几道小菜做为犒劳，当然那个时候不流行给大客户抽奖之类的尾牙聚会，最多就是《海上花》里面梁朝伟和李嘉欣那样吃几样小菜，温一温黄酒，然后希望来年继续多多捧场。不过私房菜做到最后就是消灭了原有的各类牌照，将利益最大化之后，依靠着几个老饕的轮流捧场，不断在工艺上推陈出新，有时候想想和大陆的农家菜或者什么毛豆阿姨之类的，颇有几分类似，不过真正上了名贵的燕鲍翅之后，显然就不好在家里继续SOHO了，于是做大做强的野心昭然若现。在今天中国的餐饮界哪个不想做小肥羊或者俏江南呢？除了可以挣现金之外，还可以上市圈钱，显然是利益最大化的好选择，既然是好的选择那么于公于私就不要太过于讲究了。
私房菜吃多了，但是私房内衣秀却还是第一次见到。所谓中国大牌子的“麦加”就是指上海的恒隆广场，如果在这里看不到阁下的品牌，不要说你是卢浮宫珍藏的，你就是少年宫珍藏的都没戏。于是在恒隆的周围聚集了众多渴望成为大牌或者显然就是大牌的水货聚集地。当然了，水货并不是说它是假货，只是它没有按照正常的手续进口，或者是商家自己安排买手去欧洲进货，但是并不在专卖地里面出现的产品。恒隆的周围众多老式里弄洋房里面散布着这样的小店，如果说恒隆或者中信泰富是城门的话，它们就是池鱼。也可以说它们是站在了巨人的肩膀上。在一个周五的傍晚，我很兴奋的参加了一次内衣私房秀的活动。首先大家坐在中信泰富楼下的星巴克里面碰头，于是各路人马开始聚集，因为大家都很好奇，这种所谓的一对一的内衣秀究竟会是如何呢？我倒是和朋友在纽约时代广场的附近看到过一对一的内衣秀，可惜不是在秀内衣，而是在秀舞娘的身材。事先召集人已经告诉大家，模特不多，货品很多。于是浮想联翩的安迪偷偷问我，难道真是一个模特儿对一群看客吗？在我们步入中信泰富对面的院子的时候，老式里弄洋房的幽静并不比陕西北路荣家老宅的规模相差太远。拾阶而上，一如上海众多老式住宅的昏暗，走廊上的几瓦小灯泡给我们一种神秘的意味，难道推开二楼这扇门真的会豁然开朗吗？答案倒是肯定的。那扇门打开之后，里面显然是另外的一种风情，完全是按照巴黎的设计风格重新装修的，甚至连天花都作了细部的处理，护墙板的颜色给你一种暧昧的呼唤，而最明显的水晶吊灯给我们一种比较正式的专卖店风格。厚厚的地毯踩在脚下，空调无声的开着，温度完全的降了下来。刚刚那种七十二家房客的老式里弄的感觉都被那扇大门给隔绝了。主人是一位精明能干的台湾姑娘，而她做为内衣的买手所经营的内衣显然是和淮海路上的古今系列有所不同。比较有趣的是今天除了召集人是女孩子之外，一水儿的放牛班全男生，反而开始有些不好意思。她把音乐打开，房间里面开始弥漫着HOTEL系列的音乐，在DJ台旁边的巧克力和红酒使得没有吃晚饭的朋友们减少了拘束。台湾姑娘开始询问大家给自己的女友是否需要送一件内衣或者睡衣等等。最紧张的时候到了：如果你们觉得好看，但是没有把握知道女友是否合适的话，我们的模特儿可以传给你看！这个时候，一位个头矮小但是某些部位还算丰满的姑娘出现在大家面前，她羞涩的笑着，希望我们选好了之后预订她的试穿。这些内衣都是她采购自欧洲的名牌内衣店，不乏恒隆里面的大牌子，但是也许是由于货品的问题，那些牌子显然还没有在中国推出它们的内衣产品。如果可以在这里买一件名牌内衣，倒是一个很好的选择。
专业的眼光来看这个姑娘似乎不是很适合做内衣模特儿，尽管我们都不是经纪公司的，但是看到姑娘胳膊上种植的牛痘以及估计本周蚊子新鲜来访的痕迹，感到近距离看一个内衣模特儿是不礼貌的。但是姑娘显然是习惯了客人的眼光，大方的进到里间去更换第一套的内衣。在迷幻的LOUNGE音乐的召唤下，内衣秀开始了。虽然没有追光灯，但是小小的房间里面，挤着七八个彬彬有礼的男性客户，模特儿从容的站在距离你不到10公分的地方，的确无论款式还是质地都可以看得清清楚楚。
显然这样的销售手法要比在柜台前面要求一个陌生顾客试试你的太太的尺码更加高明很多。估计很多男性客人都有过被各种热心大妈要求给她的儿子买衣服时候看看尺码的经历，但是我敢保证如果在一家内衣店里面去要求一位陌生的女客人为自己的女友试一试某杯的内衣，你先要确定对方是否也是同样尺码，这的确有些勉为其难。这种有容乃大的要求在这种内衣私房秀里面完全得到了解决。同来的客人还没有选好，门铃响了，第二批接踵而至，显然生意还是很不错。在我们离开的时候，我偷偷的问安迪，你为什么不给你的女朋友买一件呢？他笑着告诉我，他觉得内衣和鞋子一样，还是让她们自己来买比较好。另外他买的内衣都是用来撕的，显然这种两三千人民币的内衣，他的确有些不忍心下手。
目击藏传佛教法会
英国《金融时报》中文网特约撰稿人邬东言
2007年9月28日 星期五
刚刚在非常偏远的藏区参加了一个藏传佛教的盛大法会。对于一个一直生活在大都市的人来说，最大的收获，就是重新见识了久违了的信仰的力量。
法会开在深山里的一座寺庙。从主要的公路到寺庙，虽然只有二十多公里路，但是由于是土路，又是山路，所以车队足足开了两个小时，像一串蜗牛在慢慢蜿蜒。
土路沿着一条清澈的河流，向着山谷深处蔓延，似乎永远也没有尽头。沿途有三个藏族的自然村落。寺庙活佛的车开在最前面。当第一个村子出现在视野时，漫山遍野，出现了众多插满彩旗的摩托车，隆隆的马达声，突如其来地，打破了山谷的寂静。原来，当地的风俗习惯是，每次活佛回寺庙，当地藏民都要到路口来迎接，并且一直护送二十多公里一直到寺庙。只不过以前是骑马，而现在换了现代的交通工具——摩托车。形式可以改变，传统是不能丢弃的。
活佛的车子开过的地方，一队一队的藏民很有秩序地站在路边，捧着哈达迎接。很多藏民不顾身体的年迈，跑步追着活佛的车子，很恭敬地要给活佛钱。我好奇地跑过去看，居然大多数都是一元两元的破烂票子。但是看他们每个人小心翼翼的样子，这很可能是他们所有的现钱了。
法会为期三天，基本上是当地人的一次狂欢节日。每天一大早天刚蒙蒙亮，喇嘛和活佛就开始念经，一般上午九十点钟的样子，正式的法事活动就结束了，狂欢正式开始。所有人轮番在寺庙前的广场上载歌载舞，一直到太阳将近落山才散场。这可是四千米的高原啊，我可是上个二楼都气喘如牛的。
为了众多客人的到来，寺庙里每个房间里都新安装了很多亮亮的灯泡。不知道是否是因为点惯长明灯的缘故，所有的灯居然都没有装开关！我们这些远方来的客人们，每天只好爬上爬下地忙着装卸灯泡。
我的好朋友把她的手机掉在地上了，回头去找，捡到的人无论如何不肯承认。结果，有看到他捡的藏民主动跑来告诉我朋友，说亲眼看到谁谁捡了她的手机，那个人的名字是什么，是哪里来的等等，还抱歉地解释说，那个人是从外面城市里来卖小商品的，不是他们本地人。于是我朋友顺利地要回了她的手机。
在法会期间，不断地有藏民到活佛的房间，请活佛对着他们有病痛的地方吹气，然后就在我的眼前，生龙活虎兴高采烈地离去，像是被医好了！
法会的最后一天，我的帽子挤丢了。上千人的大广场，上哪里去找？虽然是一顶不值钱的帽子，但是在艳阳浓烈的高原，还真是必需品。最不可思议的是，过了一会儿，居然有一个不认识的藏民，拿着我的帽子，跑到我面前，问是否是我的帽子！在那一刻，我真的相信他是菩萨化现的！
昨天晚上，看了美国的记录片《关于宇宙，你不知道的Ｘ》。片子中几乎集中了目前世界上最顶尖的科学家们，用量子物理学、神经学、化学等各个科学领域的最新研究成果告诉我们，这个宇宙一些基本规律。其中包括：时间的可逆性，万物的统一性，精神如何作用于物质等等。我在看的时候想，藏民可能一辈子都听不懂，甚至听不到这些新鲜深奥的名词，但是，千百年来，他们却身体力行地实践着。
《生活时尚》
2007年9月28日 星期五
刚刚在非常偏远的藏区参加了一个藏传佛教的盛大法会。对于一个一直生活在大都市的人来说，最大的收获，就是重新见识了久违了的信仰的力量。
法会开在深山里的一座寺庙。从主要的公路到寺庙，虽然只有二十多公里路，但是由于是土路，又是山路，所以车队足足开了两个小时，像一串蜗牛在慢慢蜿蜒。
土路沿着一条清澈的河流，向着山谷深处蔓延，似乎永远也没有尽头。沿途有三个藏族的自然村落。寺庙活佛的车开在最前面。当第一个村子出现在视野时，漫山遍野，出现了众多插满彩旗的摩托车，隆隆的马达声，突如其来地，打破了山谷的寂静。原来，当地的风俗习惯是，每次活佛回寺庙，当地藏民都要到路口来迎接，并且一直护送二十多公里一直到寺庙。只不过以前是骑马，而现在换了现代的交通工具——摩托车。形式可以改变，传统是不能丢弃的。
活佛的车子开过的地方，一队一队的藏民很有秩序地站在路边，捧着哈达迎接。很多藏民不顾身体的年迈，跑步追着活佛的车子，很恭敬地要给活佛钱。我好奇地跑过去看，居然大多数都是一元两元的破烂票子。但是看他们每个人小心翼翼的样子，这很可能是他们所有的现钱了。
法会为期三天，基本上是当地人的一次狂欢节日。每天一大早天刚蒙蒙亮，喇嘛和活佛就开始念经，一般上午九十点钟的样子，正式的法事活动就结束了，狂欢正式开始。所有人轮番在寺庙前的广场上载歌载舞，一直到太阳将近落山才散场。这可是四千米的高原啊，我可是上个二楼都气喘如牛的。
为了众多客人的到来，寺庙里每个房间里都新安装了很多亮亮的灯泡。不知道是否是因为点惯长明灯的缘故，所有的灯居然都没有装开关！我们这些远方来的客人们，每天只好爬上爬下地忙着装卸灯泡。
我的好朋友把她的手机掉在地上了，回头去找，捡到的人无论如何不肯承认。结果，有看到他捡的藏民主动跑来告诉我朋友，说亲眼看到谁谁捡了她的手机，那个人的名字是什么，是哪里来的等等，还抱歉地解释说，那个人是从外面城市里来卖小商品的，不是他们本地人。于是我朋友顺利地要回了她的手机。
在法会期间，不断地有藏民到活佛的房间，请活佛对着他们有病痛的地方吹气，然后就在我的眼前，生龙活虎兴高采烈地离去，像是被医好了！
法会的最后一天，我的帽子挤丢了。上千人的大广场，上哪里去找？虽然是一顶不值钱的帽子，但是在艳阳浓烈的高原，还真是必需品。最不可思议的是，过了一会儿，居然有一个不认识的藏民，拿着我的帽子，跑到我面前，问是否是我的帽子！在那一刻，我真的相信他是菩萨化现的！
昨天晚上，看了美国的记录片《关于宇宙，你不知道的Ｘ》。片子中几乎集中了目前世界上最顶尖的科学家们，用量子物理学、神经学、化学等各个科学领域的最新研究成果告诉我们，这个宇宙一些基本规律。其中包括：时间的可逆性，万物的统一性，精神如何作用于物质等等。我在看的时候想，藏民可能一辈子都听不懂，甚至听不到这些新鲜深奥的名词，但是，千百年来，他们却身体力行地实践着。
《生活时尚》
Chinese manufacturing
Plenty of blame to go around
Sep 27th 2007 | LONDON AND SHENZHEN
From The Economist print edition
Mattel tries to rescue its relationship with its Chinese suppliers
THE apology was late, reluctant and was no sooner made than it was partly retracted. “Mattel takes full responsibility for these recalls and apologises personally to you, the Chinese people and all of our customers who received the toys,” said Thomas Debrowski, a senior executive at the world's biggest toymaker, which has had to recall 21m toys this year. His words came in a meeting in Beijing on September 21st with Li Changjiang, the chief of China's quality watchdog. But a few hours later Mattel said that the nature of the meeting had been “mischaracterised”. The apology in Beijing was not a kowtow to the Chinese, it said, but merely an elaboration of the apology it had already made to consumers all over the world.
AP
Sorry, sort ofMr Debrowski had not intended to talk to Mr Changjiang in the presence of journalists, but Chinese officials made it a condition for the meeting. After months of what they consider to be unfair accusations of shoddy production, the Chinese felt a public apology was long overdue. On September 5th Mattel had told an American Congressional committee that its recall of 17.4m toys containing a small magnet that could be swallowed by children was due to a flaw in the toys' design, rather than production flaws in China. As for some other toys recalled because of allegedly hazardous levels of lead in their paint, Mattel admitted that it had been overzealous and is likely to have recalled toys that did not contravene American regulations on lead content.
“Mattel has a China problem and a supply-chain problem,” says Jean-Pierre Lehmann, an Asia expert at IMD, a business school in Lausanne. The company is dependent on cheap Chinese production for most of its wares, so it has little bargaining power and can be bounced into an apology. Of the roughly 800m toys Mattel produces every year, more than two-thirds are made in China and about half are made at the company's own plants. The firm says subcontractors have to comply with safety and quality standards specified for each toy. It does not add that it is also up to Mattel to check for compliance and not to be cavalier towards its own rules.
And that is the nub of the problem. Western companies in China are operating in a largely lawless environment. There is hardly any effective regulation and little recourse to law. Yan Jiangying of the State Food and Drug Administration (SFDA) admitted this week that the country's “supervisory foundations are still weak”. In August the government published its first white paper on food safety in the wake of 96 deaths from food poisoning in the first half of the year. With oversight of food safety spread between five different ministries, responsibilities are still murky. The Chinese have no culture of compliance and cut corners on safety and quality when squeezed on price, says Susan Aaronson of the George Washington University School of Business in Washington, DC.
So western firms doing business in China have a responsibility to do their homework and keep a vigilant eye on their suppliers. Buyers of toothpaste or dog food, which have also been subject to safety scares and recalls this year, should have known that more than one-fifth of China's food products failed government safety-tests last year. Corruption, blackmail and counterfeiting are rampant. Eight buyers at Carrefour, a French supermarket chain, are under investigation for accepting kickbacks from suppliers. Zheng Xiaoyu, a former boss of the SFDA, was executed earlier this year for taking bribes to approve fake drugs and certificates claiming that the paint used by Mattel's suppliers was lead-free. Yet many foreign managers working locally say bosses in Europe or America do not understand these problems, or do not want to hear about them.
Chinese firms, for their part, complain that they are bullied by foreign purchasing managers to cut costs. This forces them to squeeze their own suppliers, with unpredictable consequences. Local firms also moan about having to meet the complex logistical demands of foreign customers in a country where such costs are typically 15% higher than in the West, according to Jürgen Kracht at Fiducia, a consultancy.
Mr Lehmann says the Chinese focus on high-volume, low-cost manufacturing has worked well in the initial phase of the country's economic take-off. But producers must now pay more attention to quality, brand development, governance and transparency, he says, or more harm will be done to “Made in China”. Almost 40% of British consumers are less likely to buy Chinese-made toys because of Mattel's recall crisis, according to a YouGov survey commissioned by Marketing Week, a trade publication. Hamleys, a toy shop, says it is thinking about sourcing more toys from Europe. This Christmas is unlikely to be quite as festive as usual for Mattel's managers, suppliers or shareholders.
Sep 27th 2007 | LONDON AND SHENZHEN
From The Economist print edition
Mattel tries to rescue its relationship with its Chinese suppliers
THE apology was late, reluctant and was no sooner made than it was partly retracted. “Mattel takes full responsibility for these recalls and apologises personally to you, the Chinese people and all of our customers who received the toys,” said Thomas Debrowski, a senior executive at the world's biggest toymaker, which has had to recall 21m toys this year. His words came in a meeting in Beijing on September 21st with Li Changjiang, the chief of China's quality watchdog. But a few hours later Mattel said that the nature of the meeting had been “mischaracterised”. The apology in Beijing was not a kowtow to the Chinese, it said, but merely an elaboration of the apology it had already made to consumers all over the world.
AP
Sorry, sort ofMr Debrowski had not intended to talk to Mr Changjiang in the presence of journalists, but Chinese officials made it a condition for the meeting. After months of what they consider to be unfair accusations of shoddy production, the Chinese felt a public apology was long overdue. On September 5th Mattel had told an American Congressional committee that its recall of 17.4m toys containing a small magnet that could be swallowed by children was due to a flaw in the toys' design, rather than production flaws in China. As for some other toys recalled because of allegedly hazardous levels of lead in their paint, Mattel admitted that it had been overzealous and is likely to have recalled toys that did not contravene American regulations on lead content.
“Mattel has a China problem and a supply-chain problem,” says Jean-Pierre Lehmann, an Asia expert at IMD, a business school in Lausanne. The company is dependent on cheap Chinese production for most of its wares, so it has little bargaining power and can be bounced into an apology. Of the roughly 800m toys Mattel produces every year, more than two-thirds are made in China and about half are made at the company's own plants. The firm says subcontractors have to comply with safety and quality standards specified for each toy. It does not add that it is also up to Mattel to check for compliance and not to be cavalier towards its own rules.
And that is the nub of the problem. Western companies in China are operating in a largely lawless environment. There is hardly any effective regulation and little recourse to law. Yan Jiangying of the State Food and Drug Administration (SFDA) admitted this week that the country's “supervisory foundations are still weak”. In August the government published its first white paper on food safety in the wake of 96 deaths from food poisoning in the first half of the year. With oversight of food safety spread between five different ministries, responsibilities are still murky. The Chinese have no culture of compliance and cut corners on safety and quality when squeezed on price, says Susan Aaronson of the George Washington University School of Business in Washington, DC.
So western firms doing business in China have a responsibility to do their homework and keep a vigilant eye on their suppliers. Buyers of toothpaste or dog food, which have also been subject to safety scares and recalls this year, should have known that more than one-fifth of China's food products failed government safety-tests last year. Corruption, blackmail and counterfeiting are rampant. Eight buyers at Carrefour, a French supermarket chain, are under investigation for accepting kickbacks from suppliers. Zheng Xiaoyu, a former boss of the SFDA, was executed earlier this year for taking bribes to approve fake drugs and certificates claiming that the paint used by Mattel's suppliers was lead-free. Yet many foreign managers working locally say bosses in Europe or America do not understand these problems, or do not want to hear about them.
Chinese firms, for their part, complain that they are bullied by foreign purchasing managers to cut costs. This forces them to squeeze their own suppliers, with unpredictable consequences. Local firms also moan about having to meet the complex logistical demands of foreign customers in a country where such costs are typically 15% higher than in the West, according to Jürgen Kracht at Fiducia, a consultancy.
Mr Lehmann says the Chinese focus on high-volume, low-cost manufacturing has worked well in the initial phase of the country's economic take-off. But producers must now pay more attention to quality, brand development, governance and transparency, he says, or more harm will be done to “Made in China”. Almost 40% of British consumers are less likely to buy Chinese-made toys because of Mattel's recall crisis, according to a YouGov survey commissioned by Marketing Week, a trade publication. Hamleys, a toy shop, says it is thinking about sourcing more toys from Europe. This Christmas is unlikely to be quite as festive as usual for Mattel's managers, suppliers or shareholders.
Stronger China
Sep 27th 2007
From The Economist print edition
Thanks to China, an American recession need not cause the whole world to crash
Illustration by Bill ButcherECONOMISTS have long warned that the world economy could not fly for ever on the single engine of American demand. A one-engined plane is more likely to crash. With its housing market blighted and its consumers growing fearful, America now faces a mounting risk of recession. The good news, however, is that the world has found some powerful new engines in China and other emerging economies. Even as credit markets seize up, a world economy that is less dependent on the United States is more likely to stay aloft.
The power of this new motor is startling. For several years, emerging Asian economies have accounted for more of global GDP growth than America has. This year China alone will for the first time accomplish the same feat all on its own (at market exchange rates), even if American growth holds up. American consumer spending is roughly four times the size of China's and India's combined, but what matters for global growth is the extra dollars of spending generated each year. In the first half of 2007 the increase in consumer spending (in actual dollar terms) in China and India together contributed more to global GDP growth than the increase in America did.
Of course, this silver lining has its cloud. A sharp slowdown in China now would have much nastier global consequences than in the past, and the Chinese economy has weaknesses. But it does not look like getting into trouble over the next couple of years (see article)—the period in which America looks as though it may be feeble. If China can keep flying high, it will help keep the world economy safe.
Of course, if America suffers a recession, then Asia's exports will weaken. But this should not hurt GDP growth too much because other factors should help offset the weakening. It helps that China and most other Asian emerging economies are now exporting more to the European Union than to America. China's exports to other emerging economies are growing even faster. It helps, too, that domestic spending has strengthened and is likely to stay strong: China, along with most of the rest of Asia, is one of few parts of the world without a housing bubble.
If emerging Asian economies start to look weak, their governments have some scope to strengthen them. Most, with the exception of India, have small budget deficits; some even have surpluses. So if exports collapse, governments also have ample scope to boost domestic demand.
Commodity prices, too, will continue to feel the effect of the emerging economies' increased importance. It is commonly assumed that an American recession would cause a sharp fall in the prices of oil and other commodities. But emerging Asia accounted for two-thirds of the increase in world energy demand over the past five years. So if Asia remains strong, commodity prices should too, and commodity-producing emerging economies such as Brazil, Russia and the Middle East will also continue to thrive.
Steady on
Emerging Asia cannot pick up all the slack if America goes into recession. Average world growth will slow—and, arguably, it needs to. But Asia can help to keep the world chugging along. Indeed, a modest slowing in the American economy could even help Asia in the long run if it forces governments to switch the mix of growth from exports to consumption and so make their future growth more sustainable.
Not so long ago, the rich world used to regard emerging economies as risky and unstable. That view needs to change: emerging economies now look like a force for stabilising the world economy.
From The Economist print edition
Thanks to China, an American recession need not cause the whole world to crash
Illustration by Bill ButcherECONOMISTS have long warned that the world economy could not fly for ever on the single engine of American demand. A one-engined plane is more likely to crash. With its housing market blighted and its consumers growing fearful, America now faces a mounting risk of recession. The good news, however, is that the world has found some powerful new engines in China and other emerging economies. Even as credit markets seize up, a world economy that is less dependent on the United States is more likely to stay aloft.
The power of this new motor is startling. For several years, emerging Asian economies have accounted for more of global GDP growth than America has. This year China alone will for the first time accomplish the same feat all on its own (at market exchange rates), even if American growth holds up. American consumer spending is roughly four times the size of China's and India's combined, but what matters for global growth is the extra dollars of spending generated each year. In the first half of 2007 the increase in consumer spending (in actual dollar terms) in China and India together contributed more to global GDP growth than the increase in America did.
Of course, this silver lining has its cloud. A sharp slowdown in China now would have much nastier global consequences than in the past, and the Chinese economy has weaknesses. But it does not look like getting into trouble over the next couple of years (see article)—the period in which America looks as though it may be feeble. If China can keep flying high, it will help keep the world economy safe.
Of course, if America suffers a recession, then Asia's exports will weaken. But this should not hurt GDP growth too much because other factors should help offset the weakening. It helps that China and most other Asian emerging economies are now exporting more to the European Union than to America. China's exports to other emerging economies are growing even faster. It helps, too, that domestic spending has strengthened and is likely to stay strong: China, along with most of the rest of Asia, is one of few parts of the world without a housing bubble.
If emerging Asian economies start to look weak, their governments have some scope to strengthen them. Most, with the exception of India, have small budget deficits; some even have surpluses. So if exports collapse, governments also have ample scope to boost domestic demand.
Commodity prices, too, will continue to feel the effect of the emerging economies' increased importance. It is commonly assumed that an American recession would cause a sharp fall in the prices of oil and other commodities. But emerging Asia accounted for two-thirds of the increase in world energy demand over the past five years. So if Asia remains strong, commodity prices should too, and commodity-producing emerging economies such as Brazil, Russia and the Middle East will also continue to thrive.
Steady on
Emerging Asia cannot pick up all the slack if America goes into recession. Average world growth will slow—and, arguably, it needs to. But Asia can help to keep the world chugging along. Indeed, a modest slowing in the American economy could even help Asia in the long run if it forces governments to switch the mix of growth from exports to consumption and so make their future growth more sustainable.
Not so long ago, the rich world used to regard emerging economies as risky and unstable. That view needs to change: emerging economies now look like a force for stabilising the world economy.
驾车游吐鲁番
英国《金融时报》中文网特约撰稿人俞雷
2007年9月28日 星期五
乌鲁木齐车行200多公里处，是著名的葡萄之乡吐鲁番。但这样远的路程对于广袤的新疆来讲，只算是近郊。
从乌鲁木齐到吐鲁番需经过天山。天山的景象，与我想像当中梁羽生笔下“天山派”纵横捭阖的武林圣地完全不同。天山七剑与冰川天女是见不到的，天山派自然也不会在这只有风没有人烟的地方生活与习武。天山是由黑色的石头组成的，尽管这些年来也陆续地冒出了一些绿色，但黑色的石头和戈壁，还是充盈着我们的视野。
这里只有寂寞的长路和不息的风，甚至亚洲最大的风力发电厂也在此处。从关闭的车厢里望出去，除了风车在缓慢地摆动之外，一切都似乎是静止的。但你只要把车窗打开一点缝隙，那呼啸的风就会让你领略到它的疯狂。就算是在平时，下了车你也会感到举步维艰，风大的时候，足够卷走一个人。
2个多小时之后，终于到了“近郊”吐鲁番。你很难相信这是一座城市，至多是公路两旁的一些建筑。但吐鲁番终究是有了绿色的，道两旁也都种着树木，这是戈壁滩中的一个绿洲。
吐鲁番迎接我们的首先并不是它那著名的葡萄，而是羊肉和“卡瓦斯”。通常维族的餐厅是不能抽烟和喝酒的，但有一些会有卡瓦斯。卡瓦斯是维族人的啤酒，却没有啤酒的苦味，有的是蜂蜜的甜。卡瓦斯非常容易上口，尤其是就着羊肉一起吃。但这毕竟是酒，喝多了也会上头。
原先我们预想中的满世界的葡萄并没有见到，不过还是在葡萄沟景区的门口看到了一些水果摊。吐鲁番的水果的确是比别的地方要甜，至少我们吃的西瓜是这样的。据说这个地方到处是孔的房子就是葡萄干制作的场地。也许我去的时候刚好是葡萄节结束，哪怕是在葡萄沟，也没有见到维族人在葡萄架下载歌载舞狂欢的场景。葡萄架是有的，葡萄也分明挂着，可惜太高了，只能作为树荫一样的装饰。
葡萄沟是一条峡谷。这个峡谷离“火焰山”相去不远。你很难想像这样的一块宜人绿洲居然可以和火焰山的灼热同时并存。葡萄沟甚至还有在这里难得一见的水沟，若不是土地偶尔露出一点黄色，你会觉得这里和江南的一些山区相去并不远，只是浓荫蔽日的树木换成了葡萄架。
葡萄是熟了，心儿醉了的阿娜尔罕却没有遇见。在葡萄沟，若是想和打扮妖娆的维族女郎合影，还得付点钱。除了她们，104岁的长寿老人也成了一个付费合影景点。据说葡萄沟的水土是养人的，这里也是著名的长寿之乡。
这样的水土还培养了王洛宾的浪漫。在吐鲁番不远处风沙漫天的达坂城，王洛宾谱下过脍炙人口的爱情歌曲《达坂城的姑娘》。但若是你要再来寻找长辫子和大眼睛，恐怕多半是会失望的。
《2007旅游特辑》
2007年9月28日 星期五
乌鲁木齐车行200多公里处，是著名的葡萄之乡吐鲁番。但这样远的路程对于广袤的新疆来讲，只算是近郊。
从乌鲁木齐到吐鲁番需经过天山。天山的景象，与我想像当中梁羽生笔下“天山派”纵横捭阖的武林圣地完全不同。天山七剑与冰川天女是见不到的，天山派自然也不会在这只有风没有人烟的地方生活与习武。天山是由黑色的石头组成的，尽管这些年来也陆续地冒出了一些绿色，但黑色的石头和戈壁，还是充盈着我们的视野。
这里只有寂寞的长路和不息的风，甚至亚洲最大的风力发电厂也在此处。从关闭的车厢里望出去，除了风车在缓慢地摆动之外，一切都似乎是静止的。但你只要把车窗打开一点缝隙，那呼啸的风就会让你领略到它的疯狂。就算是在平时，下了车你也会感到举步维艰，风大的时候，足够卷走一个人。
2个多小时之后，终于到了“近郊”吐鲁番。你很难相信这是一座城市，至多是公路两旁的一些建筑。但吐鲁番终究是有了绿色的，道两旁也都种着树木，这是戈壁滩中的一个绿洲。
吐鲁番迎接我们的首先并不是它那著名的葡萄，而是羊肉和“卡瓦斯”。通常维族的餐厅是不能抽烟和喝酒的，但有一些会有卡瓦斯。卡瓦斯是维族人的啤酒，却没有啤酒的苦味，有的是蜂蜜的甜。卡瓦斯非常容易上口，尤其是就着羊肉一起吃。但这毕竟是酒，喝多了也会上头。
原先我们预想中的满世界的葡萄并没有见到，不过还是在葡萄沟景区的门口看到了一些水果摊。吐鲁番的水果的确是比别的地方要甜，至少我们吃的西瓜是这样的。据说这个地方到处是孔的房子就是葡萄干制作的场地。也许我去的时候刚好是葡萄节结束，哪怕是在葡萄沟，也没有见到维族人在葡萄架下载歌载舞狂欢的场景。葡萄架是有的，葡萄也分明挂着，可惜太高了，只能作为树荫一样的装饰。
葡萄沟是一条峡谷。这个峡谷离“火焰山”相去不远。你很难想像这样的一块宜人绿洲居然可以和火焰山的灼热同时并存。葡萄沟甚至还有在这里难得一见的水沟，若不是土地偶尔露出一点黄色，你会觉得这里和江南的一些山区相去并不远，只是浓荫蔽日的树木换成了葡萄架。
葡萄是熟了，心儿醉了的阿娜尔罕却没有遇见。在葡萄沟，若是想和打扮妖娆的维族女郎合影，还得付点钱。除了她们，104岁的长寿老人也成了一个付费合影景点。据说葡萄沟的水土是养人的，这里也是著名的长寿之乡。
这样的水土还培养了王洛宾的浪漫。在吐鲁番不远处风沙漫天的达坂城，王洛宾谱下过脍炙人口的爱情歌曲《达坂城的姑娘》。但若是你要再来寻找长辫子和大眼睛，恐怕多半是会失望的。
《2007旅游特辑》
news on beijing
Averting a blow-up
China's 17th Party Congress, its biggest political event for five years, opens in Beijing on October 15th. Officials are taking no chances with security. Police have been sweeping the greater Beijing area for illegal explosives, using trained dogs and electronic detection devices, and focusing on abandoned houses and underground markets. On September 12th they found over 500 grams of explosive powder in Beijing’s Mentougou district. This did not seem to constitute a security threat: the area is home to many small, illegal coal-mining operations that routinely use explosives.
AP
Just wanting somewhere to stay
Let down
Landlords and estate agents in Beijing are bristling over new police rules that forbid them from letting to tenants who lead “irregular lifestyles”. The state-run China Daily reported on September 7th that the regulations affect not just would-be residents who lack legal identity documents or engage in illegal activities, but also those who “keep unsociable hours”. The newspaper quoted a police official as saying the rules would improve the administration of the leasing market, safeguard public security and maintain social order.
The fair way, not the fairway
Life is about to get bleaker for Beijing's elite sports enthusiasts. According to state media, the city is banning the construction of new golf courses, racetracks and ski areas. Rising living standards have boosted demand for such land-intensive amusements: the city is already home to about 30 golf courses. But the central government and the Municipal Bureau of State Land and Resources have put a stop to new projects and plan instead to allocate more land for residential use. New residences account for only 1,600 of the 6,300 hectares approved for development in 2007.
Low blood count
Health officials in Beijing are scrambling to shore up the supply of Rh-negative blood in the city's blood banks. This type is exceedingly rare in China, occurring in only three out of every 10,000 people (0.03%). But about 15% of Westerners are Rhesus negative, and with Beijing expecting more than 500,000 foreign visitors for next year's Olympics, officials have been taking action. They are appealing for blood from—and updating their databases of—China's few eligible donors; prolonging the shelf life of existing stocks with better storage; and co-ordinating with other provinces to obtain additional supplies.
Travel spotlight
Travellers using Beijing Capital International Airport can expect changes soon. Officials have announced that a third runway will become operational from October 2007 and that a third terminal will be finished by February 2008 (though not fully operational until the summer). With the two existing terminals already operating well beyond their 35m-passenger annual capacity (in 2006 they handled almost 49m travellers), the third terminal will be crucial for the upcoming Olympics. The $2.8 billion terminal will boost capacity to 82m, well above the 60m expected in 2008. With passenger volume forecast to continue rising, construction work on a second airport will start in 2010.
China's 17th Party Congress, its biggest political event for five years, opens in Beijing on October 15th. Officials are taking no chances with security. Police have been sweeping the greater Beijing area for illegal explosives, using trained dogs and electronic detection devices, and focusing on abandoned houses and underground markets. On September 12th they found over 500 grams of explosive powder in Beijing’s Mentougou district. This did not seem to constitute a security threat: the area is home to many small, illegal coal-mining operations that routinely use explosives.
AP
Just wanting somewhere to stay
Let down
Landlords and estate agents in Beijing are bristling over new police rules that forbid them from letting to tenants who lead “irregular lifestyles”. The state-run China Daily reported on September 7th that the regulations affect not just would-be residents who lack legal identity documents or engage in illegal activities, but also those who “keep unsociable hours”. The newspaper quoted a police official as saying the rules would improve the administration of the leasing market, safeguard public security and maintain social order.
The fair way, not the fairway
Life is about to get bleaker for Beijing's elite sports enthusiasts. According to state media, the city is banning the construction of new golf courses, racetracks and ski areas. Rising living standards have boosted demand for such land-intensive amusements: the city is already home to about 30 golf courses. But the central government and the Municipal Bureau of State Land and Resources have put a stop to new projects and plan instead to allocate more land for residential use. New residences account for only 1,600 of the 6,300 hectares approved for development in 2007.
Low blood count
Health officials in Beijing are scrambling to shore up the supply of Rh-negative blood in the city's blood banks. This type is exceedingly rare in China, occurring in only three out of every 10,000 people (0.03%). But about 15% of Westerners are Rhesus negative, and with Beijing expecting more than 500,000 foreign visitors for next year's Olympics, officials have been taking action. They are appealing for blood from—and updating their databases of—China's few eligible donors; prolonging the shelf life of existing stocks with better storage; and co-ordinating with other provinces to obtain additional supplies.
Travel spotlight
Travellers using Beijing Capital International Airport can expect changes soon. Officials have announced that a third runway will become operational from October 2007 and that a third terminal will be finished by February 2008 (though not fully operational until the summer). With the two existing terminals already operating well beyond their 35m-passenger annual capacity (in 2006 they handled almost 49m travellers), the third terminal will be crucial for the upcoming Olympics. The $2.8 billion terminal will boost capacity to 82m, well above the 60m expected in 2008. With passenger volume forecast to continue rising, construction work on a second airport will start in 2010.
欧洲最大私人股本拟向中国出售股权
英国《金融时报》森迪普•塔克(Sundeep Tucker)香港、马丁•阿诺德(Martin Arnold)伦敦报道
2007年9月28日 星期五
欧洲最大的私人股本集团Apax Partners正在进行相关探讨，可能向亚洲或中东的一只主权财富基金转让部分股权。随着美国竞争对手百仕通（Blackstone，原译黑石）和凯雷集团(Carlyle Group)最近各自达成合作协议，有迹象显示，欧洲的私人股本公司也正在寻求类似的合伙关系。
包括首席执行官马丁•哈鲁萨(Martin Halusa)在内的Apax高层管理人员本周对中国进行了访问，讨论一系列商业问题，其中包括中国对其投资的可能性。这种投资类似于今年5月中国一家国有投资机构收购百仕通30亿美元股权的交易。
Apax高管人士与中国公共和私营行业的高层管理人员举行了会晤，并把这称为“解释性”会谈。
据悉，总部设在英国的Apax还在研究，是否可以从其它亚洲国家和中东获得类似投资。了解谈判的人士强调，“谈判桌上没有拿出任何提议”。
据信，与中国投资百仕通的情况不同，有关Apax的谈判不涉及首次公开发行(IPO)计划。
Apax拒绝对此置评。
将股权出售给主权财富基金，已成为美国收购集团在新市场扩大影响力，并将其蓬勃发展的业务变现的一种流行方式。凯雷上周同意将7.5%的股权出售给阿布扎比政府的一个投资机构。
亚洲的交易商称，最近数周接待了大量来自欧洲私人股本公司的来访者，其中许多人是为了考查中国和新加坡等国资金充裕的主权财富基金是否准备进一步投资私人股本公司。
然而，新的中国投资至少要等到数月之后，因为中国政府与百仕通达成交易时曾承诺，明年5月之后才会进行类似投资。
译者/梁鸥
阅读本文章英文,请点击 APAX EYES SOVEREIGN INVESTORS
2007年9月28日 星期五
欧洲最大的私人股本集团Apax Partners正在进行相关探讨，可能向亚洲或中东的一只主权财富基金转让部分股权。随着美国竞争对手百仕通（Blackstone，原译黑石）和凯雷集团(Carlyle Group)最近各自达成合作协议，有迹象显示，欧洲的私人股本公司也正在寻求类似的合伙关系。
包括首席执行官马丁•哈鲁萨(Martin Halusa)在内的Apax高层管理人员本周对中国进行了访问，讨论一系列商业问题，其中包括中国对其投资的可能性。这种投资类似于今年5月中国一家国有投资机构收购百仕通30亿美元股权的交易。
Apax高管人士与中国公共和私营行业的高层管理人员举行了会晤，并把这称为“解释性”会谈。
据悉，总部设在英国的Apax还在研究，是否可以从其它亚洲国家和中东获得类似投资。了解谈判的人士强调，“谈判桌上没有拿出任何提议”。
据信，与中国投资百仕通的情况不同，有关Apax的谈判不涉及首次公开发行(IPO)计划。
Apax拒绝对此置评。
将股权出售给主权财富基金，已成为美国收购集团在新市场扩大影响力，并将其蓬勃发展的业务变现的一种流行方式。凯雷上周同意将7.5%的股权出售给阿布扎比政府的一个投资机构。
亚洲的交易商称，最近数周接待了大量来自欧洲私人股本公司的来访者，其中许多人是为了考查中国和新加坡等国资金充裕的主权财富基金是否准备进一步投资私人股本公司。
然而，新的中国投资至少要等到数月之后，因为中国政府与百仕通达成交易时曾承诺，明年5月之后才会进行类似投资。
译者/梁鸥
阅读本文章英文,请点击 APAX EYES SOVEREIGN INVESTORS
China's economy
How fit is the panda?
Sep 27th 2007 | BEIJING
From The Economist print edition
China's booming economy is helping to support global growth as America turns sickly. So now it has to keep up the pace
Illustration by Bill Butcher
NO COUNTRY in history has sustained such a blistering rate of growth over three decades as China. Its economy grew by a staggering 11.9% in the year to the second quarter. Since 1978 it has grown by an average of almost 10% a year—more than Japan or the Asian tigers achieved over similar periods when their economies took off. But eventually every sprinter trips. Japan's growth averaged 9.5% in the two decades to 1970, but slowed to 4.7% in the 1970s and to only 1% by the 1990s.
As China has grown, it has come to matter much more to the rest of the world. For the first time it is now contributing more to global GDP growth (measured at market exchange rates) than the United States is. Yet, even as growth forecasts for China are being revised upwards, America is looking at a downturn caused by falling house prices, which threaten to clobber consumer spending. The fate of the world economy now hinges not just on America, but also on China's economic fitness continuing over at least the next two years.
So what immediate threats does China face? The biggest worry is that the economy is overheating and inflation surging out of control. In August consumer-price inflation jumped to 6.5%, up from 1.3% a year earlier and its highest for more than a decade. If China slams on the brakes, its economy could suffer a hard landing, as happened after past episodes of inflation.
But inflation is nowhere near previous danger levels in 1988 and 1994, when it soared above 25% (see chart 1). Moreover, the leap in inflation does not seem to be a symptom of overheating caused by excess demand, as it was in the past. It is due entirely to the rise in food prices caused by supply-side problems. Excluding food, inflation is only 0.9%. This does not mean that food is unimportant: it accounts for one-third of the inflation basket, and rising prices could trigger social unrest. But it is not something that China's central bank can easily fix by raising interest rates. The bank has raised interest rates five times this year, but they still remain low relative to the country's growth rate.
Growing public concerns over inflation recently prompted Beijing to introduce a freeze until the end of 2007 on a wide range of government-controlled prices, such as oil, electricity and water. A more effective way to curb inflation would be to allow the Chinese currency to rise faster. This would reduce import prices of food and raw materials and also curb the build-up of liquidity as a result of rising foreign-exchange inflows.
Unless checked, excessive monetary growth combined with over-rapid GDP growth could eventually lead to more general inflationary pressures. In its latest “China Quarterly Update”, the World Bank says that in the first half of 2007 China grew faster than its potential growth rate (currently estimated at around 10.5%) for the first time in a decade (see chart 2). However, excess demand is tiny compared with previous phases of overheating so the risk of soaring inflation causing a hard landing in the near future is remote.
Bubble trouble
A second much-talked-about threat is the bursting of China's stockmarket bubble. Share prices have risen by 400% in just over two years, and average price-earnings ratios based on historic profits are around 50 (based on forecast 2008 profits they are a still-racy 30). Even though almost everyone reckons this is a bubble, history suggests that a bust is not imminent and that share prices could continue to rise for a lot longer: both Japan's Nikkei and America's NASDAQ saw p-e ratios well above 100 at their peaks.
Even if share prices did tumble this year, the impact on the economy would probably be relatively modest. The total value of tradable shares—that is, excluding those held by the government—is only 35% of GDP compared with 180% in America at its peak in 2000. Equities account for less than 20% of Chinese households' total financial assets, compared with half in America, so price swings have less impact on spending. When Chinese share prices collapsed by 55% from 2001 to 2005, GDP growth remained robust. Over the past year there has been little sign that people are saving less and spending their capital gains, so a slump in share prices should not have much impact either.
Share prices can also affect the cost of capital. But only a small proportion of Chinese companies are listed on the stock exchange and those that are rely mainly on internal finance. Only 10% of total financing for investment this year has come from equities. A more serious problem is that because firms have invested in other companies' stocks, a slump in share prices could directly hurt their profits and hence their investment. According to a study by Morgan Stanley, one-third of listed companies' profits in the first half of 2007 came from share-price gains and other investment income. If share prices sink, so will profits, which would make shares look even more overvalued.
Some analysts also worry that a sharp plunge in equity prices could seriously hurt banks' balance sheets, causing them to squeeze their lending. Chinese banks are officially not allowed to lend to investors to buy shares, but anecdotal evidence suggests that households and firms have taken out loans disguised as mortgages to buy shares. If so, the effect of the bubble bursting could be larger than the direct impact on consumers' wealth—especially if, as seems more likely, the bubble continues to swell for another couple of years before it finally bursts.
In many ways China today looks ominously similar to Japan before its bubble burst at the start of the 1990s, resulting in a decade of stagnation. Like Japan, China has high rates of saving and investment, low real interest rates, soaring asset prices, a big current-account surplus and upward pressure on its currency. After the Plaza accord between the big industrial countries in 1985, the Japanese yen rose by 80% against the dollar in three years.
Many in China have concluded that the blame for Japan's economic malaise in the 1990s lay largely with the appreciation of the yen. Beijing has therefore allowed the yuan to rise by only 10% since July 2005. But Japan's real mistake was its loose monetary policy to offset the impact of the rising yen—which further inflated the bubble—and then its failure to ease policy once the bust had happened. By holding down the value of the yuan and allowing a consequent build-up of excess liquidity, China risks repeating the same error.
However, Paul Cavey, a China economist at Macquarie Securities, suggests that China may have more in common with Taiwan in the 1980s than with Japan. Taiwan's bubble was even bigger, with share prices rocketing by 1,800% between 1985 and 1990. In Japan, reserve accumulation did not play a big role in the bubble. By contrast, the foreign-exchange inflows into Taiwan were greater in relation to its GDP than those seen recently in China. Taiwan, like Japan, saw a big rise in its exchange rate, by 60% in the four years to 1989.
In 1990-91 the Taipei stockmarket slumped by 75%, even more than the Tokyo market did. But Taiwan's growth remained fairly strong because policy was eased much sooner than it was in Japan. In other words, contrary to Beijing's fears, a big exchange-rate rise does not inevitably lead to economic depression.
The other big difference between China and Japan in the late 1980s is that Japan had a serious property bubble against which banks had lent heavily. Although a house-price crash would have much nastier consequences for China's economy than a share-price crash, because 80% of China's urban households now own their home, there is no evidence of a nationwide housing bubble. Average house prices across China are rising at an annual rate of 8%, with double-digit gains in some cities, such as Shenzhen and Beijing.
In a developed economy such increases might seem a little bubbly, but not in one in which nominal GDP is growing at an annual pace of 15%. The ratio of house prices to average income has fallen by 25% in China since 1999. In contrast, at their peak last year American house prices had risen by 45% relative to incomes. A collapse in house prices therefore seems unlikely in China.
If America sneezes
If neither a surge in inflation nor a bust in asset prices seem likely to derail China's economy over the next year or two, what about a recession in America? Exports account for over 40% of China's GDP, so some economists predict that a fall in exports as a result of a downturn in America would create massive excess capacity and a sharp fall in profits and investment—the making of a nasty hard landing. But the popular notion that China is dependent on export-led growth is a myth; domestic demand is much more important. This year the increase in China's net exports (ie, less imports) is likely to account for about one quarter of its growth—a record amount. But even without this external boost, GDP growth would still have been a respectable 9%.
During America's 2001 recession, China's export growth fell by 25 percentage points, but imports also slowed sharply, so GDP growth (as officially reported) remained strong. Since then, the share of its exports to America has shrunk; the European Union and other emerging economies are now more important markets. In the three months to August, Chinese exports to America increased by 14% compared with a year earlier, whereas those to the EU grew by 40%.
America's slowdown so far largely reflects a collapse in house-building, but if consumers cut their spending, the impact on Chinese exports would be harsher. The World Bank estimates that if American consumption falls by the equivalent of 1% of GDP, this could knock 0.2-0.5 percentage points off China's GDP growth, depending on how much the Federal Reserve does to cushion the downturn.
A recession in America would reduce China's growth, but since Beijing's policy-makers are fretting that the economy is starting to overheat, weaker exports and hence slower GDP growth might be a good thing. Not only would it reduce the risk of inflation, but it would also help to trim China's embarrassing trade surplus.
If a fall in exports threatens to slow growth by more than desired, the government's strong fiscal position means that it has plenty of room to boost domestic demand by spending more on infrastructure, education or health. The budget was in small deficit in 2006, but may now be in surplus—even excluding the large surpluses of state-owned enterprises. China's public-sector debt is only 18% of GDP, much lower than the 75% average in developed economies, giving the government ample room for a fiscal stimulus.
In the short term, therefore, an American downturn is more likely to cause sniffles in China than a heavy cold. Indeed, an American recession might be a blessing in disguise to China: if weaker exports forced the government to do more to boost domestic demand it would help to rebalance the economy and make growth more sustainable in the long run.
The bigger danger is that an American recession would inflame America's increasingly protectionist mood and make trade sanctions against China more likely. In an election year, politicians will need a scapegoat. But import barriers would do more harm to America's economy than China's. If China was forced to depend less on exports and more on consumption it would gain in the long run.
Running out of fuel?
In recent months there has been much talk about a new threat. China, it is claimed, is running short of cheap labour—the main source of its extraordinary growth. This is nonsense. It is true that average wages have risen by around 15% over the past year, but labour productivity in manufacturing has risen even faster. Indeed, wages have been rising at double-digit rates for a decade with no harmful impact on growth, because higher labour productivity has actually reduced wage costs (see chart 3). There are localised skill shortages, but it is hard to believe that China's labour surplus is exhausted when almost 60% of the population still lives in rural areas. The wide income gap between rural and urban areas will continue to attract workers from farms to factories.
In any case, it is not true that China's growth has been based primarily on cheap labour. Over the past decade, the increase in the labour force has contributed an average of only 1% a year, or one-tenth of its GDP growth. It is true that the population of working age will peak by 2015 and then start to shrink. But an analysis by the World Bank argues that China is unlikely to face a labour shortage for many years. The decline in the working-age population can be offset by making it easier for surplus labour to migrate into cities.
One thing China does not seem short of is capital investment. Indeed, some economists have long predicted that overinvestment as a result of an artificially cheap cost of capital will lead to China's downfall. Sooner or later, it is argued, overcapacity will lead to a plunge in capital spending, bringing the economy crashing to earth.
According to government figures, China's investment amounts to over 45% of GDP and is growing at 25% a year. But many economists reckon that is grossly overstated. For example, land purchases are wrongly counted as new investment when they are really just a transfer of ownership. If China were massively overinvesting, one would expect the return on capital to be falling. Instead, corporate profit margins have been rising. Mr Cavey estimates that average capacity utilisation, measured by the ratio of sales to assets, has been rising not falling—in strong contrast to Japan during its 1980s bubble.
Worries about rising excess capacity feed another long-standing concern that China's banks, groaning under the weight of non-performing loans, are heading for a crisis. Official figures show that non-performing loans had fallen to 7% of all loans early this year from almost 30% in 2001. But independent analysts suggest the true figure may be closer to 20% (down from over 50% at its peak). The fear is that an economic downturn and falling profits could lead to a surge in new bad loans.
China's fragile and inefficient banking system is certainly a drag on its economy, but the risk that a banking crisis could bring down the economy seems small. China has huge foreign-exchange reserves available to protect its banking system. Capital controls limit capital flight. And the government, unlike Japan's in the 1990s, has plenty of money if necessary to write off bad loans.
The list of potential threats to China's economy is long and some might shave a couple of percentage points off its growth rate (leaving it close to 10%). But none seems likely by itself to cause the economy to collapse in the next two years—ie, during the time when America's economy is likely to stumble. But what if several blows land at the same time? For example, an American recession breeds greater protectionism, global financial turmoil unnerves Chinese stockmarket investors, share prices collapse and a downturn creates social unrest. The overall impact on the economy would then be more painful.
China's best insurance against this is that its budget finances are in better shape than those of any other big economy. China's leaders are acutely aware of the risks of social unrest and they will be willing and able to try to spend their way out of trouble. That makes a sharp downturn in China less likely in the near future. But what about farther ahead?
China's economic success has been based on the essential ingredients of growth: high savings, openness to trade, good education and strong productivity growth. This means its long-term prospects remain strong, although its trend growth rate will inevitably slow as its economy matures and its labour force starts to shrink.
Tao Wang, Bank of America's economist in Beijing, says she is optimistic about China's economy in the short term and the long term, but thinks the medium term looks risky. There is a high chance of a sharp slowdown sometime within the next ten years. The problem with years of rapid growth is that it hides problems that are then painfully exposed when times are hard. But for the time being, the chances are that China can keep sprinting even if America takes to its sick bed. That is good news for the world.
Sep 27th 2007 | BEIJING
From The Economist print edition
China's booming economy is helping to support global growth as America turns sickly. So now it has to keep up the pace
Illustration by Bill Butcher
NO COUNTRY in history has sustained such a blistering rate of growth over three decades as China. Its economy grew by a staggering 11.9% in the year to the second quarter. Since 1978 it has grown by an average of almost 10% a year—more than Japan or the Asian tigers achieved over similar periods when their economies took off. But eventually every sprinter trips. Japan's growth averaged 9.5% in the two decades to 1970, but slowed to 4.7% in the 1970s and to only 1% by the 1990s.
As China has grown, it has come to matter much more to the rest of the world. For the first time it is now contributing more to global GDP growth (measured at market exchange rates) than the United States is. Yet, even as growth forecasts for China are being revised upwards, America is looking at a downturn caused by falling house prices, which threaten to clobber consumer spending. The fate of the world economy now hinges not just on America, but also on China's economic fitness continuing over at least the next two years.
So what immediate threats does China face? The biggest worry is that the economy is overheating and inflation surging out of control. In August consumer-price inflation jumped to 6.5%, up from 1.3% a year earlier and its highest for more than a decade. If China slams on the brakes, its economy could suffer a hard landing, as happened after past episodes of inflation.
But inflation is nowhere near previous danger levels in 1988 and 1994, when it soared above 25% (see chart 1). Moreover, the leap in inflation does not seem to be a symptom of overheating caused by excess demand, as it was in the past. It is due entirely to the rise in food prices caused by supply-side problems. Excluding food, inflation is only 0.9%. This does not mean that food is unimportant: it accounts for one-third of the inflation basket, and rising prices could trigger social unrest. But it is not something that China's central bank can easily fix by raising interest rates. The bank has raised interest rates five times this year, but they still remain low relative to the country's growth rate.
Growing public concerns over inflation recently prompted Beijing to introduce a freeze until the end of 2007 on a wide range of government-controlled prices, such as oil, electricity and water. A more effective way to curb inflation would be to allow the Chinese currency to rise faster. This would reduce import prices of food and raw materials and also curb the build-up of liquidity as a result of rising foreign-exchange inflows.
Unless checked, excessive monetary growth combined with over-rapid GDP growth could eventually lead to more general inflationary pressures. In its latest “China Quarterly Update”, the World Bank says that in the first half of 2007 China grew faster than its potential growth rate (currently estimated at around 10.5%) for the first time in a decade (see chart 2). However, excess demand is tiny compared with previous phases of overheating so the risk of soaring inflation causing a hard landing in the near future is remote.
Bubble trouble
A second much-talked-about threat is the bursting of China's stockmarket bubble. Share prices have risen by 400% in just over two years, and average price-earnings ratios based on historic profits are around 50 (based on forecast 2008 profits they are a still-racy 30). Even though almost everyone reckons this is a bubble, history suggests that a bust is not imminent and that share prices could continue to rise for a lot longer: both Japan's Nikkei and America's NASDAQ saw p-e ratios well above 100 at their peaks.
Even if share prices did tumble this year, the impact on the economy would probably be relatively modest. The total value of tradable shares—that is, excluding those held by the government—is only 35% of GDP compared with 180% in America at its peak in 2000. Equities account for less than 20% of Chinese households' total financial assets, compared with half in America, so price swings have less impact on spending. When Chinese share prices collapsed by 55% from 2001 to 2005, GDP growth remained robust. Over the past year there has been little sign that people are saving less and spending their capital gains, so a slump in share prices should not have much impact either.
Share prices can also affect the cost of capital. But only a small proportion of Chinese companies are listed on the stock exchange and those that are rely mainly on internal finance. Only 10% of total financing for investment this year has come from equities. A more serious problem is that because firms have invested in other companies' stocks, a slump in share prices could directly hurt their profits and hence their investment. According to a study by Morgan Stanley, one-third of listed companies' profits in the first half of 2007 came from share-price gains and other investment income. If share prices sink, so will profits, which would make shares look even more overvalued.
Some analysts also worry that a sharp plunge in equity prices could seriously hurt banks' balance sheets, causing them to squeeze their lending. Chinese banks are officially not allowed to lend to investors to buy shares, but anecdotal evidence suggests that households and firms have taken out loans disguised as mortgages to buy shares. If so, the effect of the bubble bursting could be larger than the direct impact on consumers' wealth—especially if, as seems more likely, the bubble continues to swell for another couple of years before it finally bursts.
In many ways China today looks ominously similar to Japan before its bubble burst at the start of the 1990s, resulting in a decade of stagnation. Like Japan, China has high rates of saving and investment, low real interest rates, soaring asset prices, a big current-account surplus and upward pressure on its currency. After the Plaza accord between the big industrial countries in 1985, the Japanese yen rose by 80% against the dollar in three years.
Many in China have concluded that the blame for Japan's economic malaise in the 1990s lay largely with the appreciation of the yen. Beijing has therefore allowed the yuan to rise by only 10% since July 2005. But Japan's real mistake was its loose monetary policy to offset the impact of the rising yen—which further inflated the bubble—and then its failure to ease policy once the bust had happened. By holding down the value of the yuan and allowing a consequent build-up of excess liquidity, China risks repeating the same error.
However, Paul Cavey, a China economist at Macquarie Securities, suggests that China may have more in common with Taiwan in the 1980s than with Japan. Taiwan's bubble was even bigger, with share prices rocketing by 1,800% between 1985 and 1990. In Japan, reserve accumulation did not play a big role in the bubble. By contrast, the foreign-exchange inflows into Taiwan were greater in relation to its GDP than those seen recently in China. Taiwan, like Japan, saw a big rise in its exchange rate, by 60% in the four years to 1989.
In 1990-91 the Taipei stockmarket slumped by 75%, even more than the Tokyo market did. But Taiwan's growth remained fairly strong because policy was eased much sooner than it was in Japan. In other words, contrary to Beijing's fears, a big exchange-rate rise does not inevitably lead to economic depression.
The other big difference between China and Japan in the late 1980s is that Japan had a serious property bubble against which banks had lent heavily. Although a house-price crash would have much nastier consequences for China's economy than a share-price crash, because 80% of China's urban households now own their home, there is no evidence of a nationwide housing bubble. Average house prices across China are rising at an annual rate of 8%, with double-digit gains in some cities, such as Shenzhen and Beijing.
In a developed economy such increases might seem a little bubbly, but not in one in which nominal GDP is growing at an annual pace of 15%. The ratio of house prices to average income has fallen by 25% in China since 1999. In contrast, at their peak last year American house prices had risen by 45% relative to incomes. A collapse in house prices therefore seems unlikely in China.
If America sneezes
If neither a surge in inflation nor a bust in asset prices seem likely to derail China's economy over the next year or two, what about a recession in America? Exports account for over 40% of China's GDP, so some economists predict that a fall in exports as a result of a downturn in America would create massive excess capacity and a sharp fall in profits and investment—the making of a nasty hard landing. But the popular notion that China is dependent on export-led growth is a myth; domestic demand is much more important. This year the increase in China's net exports (ie, less imports) is likely to account for about one quarter of its growth—a record amount. But even without this external boost, GDP growth would still have been a respectable 9%.
During America's 2001 recession, China's export growth fell by 25 percentage points, but imports also slowed sharply, so GDP growth (as officially reported) remained strong. Since then, the share of its exports to America has shrunk; the European Union and other emerging economies are now more important markets. In the three months to August, Chinese exports to America increased by 14% compared with a year earlier, whereas those to the EU grew by 40%.
America's slowdown so far largely reflects a collapse in house-building, but if consumers cut their spending, the impact on Chinese exports would be harsher. The World Bank estimates that if American consumption falls by the equivalent of 1% of GDP, this could knock 0.2-0.5 percentage points off China's GDP growth, depending on how much the Federal Reserve does to cushion the downturn.
A recession in America would reduce China's growth, but since Beijing's policy-makers are fretting that the economy is starting to overheat, weaker exports and hence slower GDP growth might be a good thing. Not only would it reduce the risk of inflation, but it would also help to trim China's embarrassing trade surplus.
If a fall in exports threatens to slow growth by more than desired, the government's strong fiscal position means that it has plenty of room to boost domestic demand by spending more on infrastructure, education or health. The budget was in small deficit in 2006, but may now be in surplus—even excluding the large surpluses of state-owned enterprises. China's public-sector debt is only 18% of GDP, much lower than the 75% average in developed economies, giving the government ample room for a fiscal stimulus.
In the short term, therefore, an American downturn is more likely to cause sniffles in China than a heavy cold. Indeed, an American recession might be a blessing in disguise to China: if weaker exports forced the government to do more to boost domestic demand it would help to rebalance the economy and make growth more sustainable in the long run.
The bigger danger is that an American recession would inflame America's increasingly protectionist mood and make trade sanctions against China more likely. In an election year, politicians will need a scapegoat. But import barriers would do more harm to America's economy than China's. If China was forced to depend less on exports and more on consumption it would gain in the long run.
Running out of fuel?
In recent months there has been much talk about a new threat. China, it is claimed, is running short of cheap labour—the main source of its extraordinary growth. This is nonsense. It is true that average wages have risen by around 15% over the past year, but labour productivity in manufacturing has risen even faster. Indeed, wages have been rising at double-digit rates for a decade with no harmful impact on growth, because higher labour productivity has actually reduced wage costs (see chart 3). There are localised skill shortages, but it is hard to believe that China's labour surplus is exhausted when almost 60% of the population still lives in rural areas. The wide income gap between rural and urban areas will continue to attract workers from farms to factories.
In any case, it is not true that China's growth has been based primarily on cheap labour. Over the past decade, the increase in the labour force has contributed an average of only 1% a year, or one-tenth of its GDP growth. It is true that the population of working age will peak by 2015 and then start to shrink. But an analysis by the World Bank argues that China is unlikely to face a labour shortage for many years. The decline in the working-age population can be offset by making it easier for surplus labour to migrate into cities.
One thing China does not seem short of is capital investment. Indeed, some economists have long predicted that overinvestment as a result of an artificially cheap cost of capital will lead to China's downfall. Sooner or later, it is argued, overcapacity will lead to a plunge in capital spending, bringing the economy crashing to earth.
According to government figures, China's investment amounts to over 45% of GDP and is growing at 25% a year. But many economists reckon that is grossly overstated. For example, land purchases are wrongly counted as new investment when they are really just a transfer of ownership. If China were massively overinvesting, one would expect the return on capital to be falling. Instead, corporate profit margins have been rising. Mr Cavey estimates that average capacity utilisation, measured by the ratio of sales to assets, has been rising not falling—in strong contrast to Japan during its 1980s bubble.
Worries about rising excess capacity feed another long-standing concern that China's banks, groaning under the weight of non-performing loans, are heading for a crisis. Official figures show that non-performing loans had fallen to 7% of all loans early this year from almost 30% in 2001. But independent analysts suggest the true figure may be closer to 20% (down from over 50% at its peak). The fear is that an economic downturn and falling profits could lead to a surge in new bad loans.
China's fragile and inefficient banking system is certainly a drag on its economy, but the risk that a banking crisis could bring down the economy seems small. China has huge foreign-exchange reserves available to protect its banking system. Capital controls limit capital flight. And the government, unlike Japan's in the 1990s, has plenty of money if necessary to write off bad loans.
The list of potential threats to China's economy is long and some might shave a couple of percentage points off its growth rate (leaving it close to 10%). But none seems likely by itself to cause the economy to collapse in the next two years—ie, during the time when America's economy is likely to stumble. But what if several blows land at the same time? For example, an American recession breeds greater protectionism, global financial turmoil unnerves Chinese stockmarket investors, share prices collapse and a downturn creates social unrest. The overall impact on the economy would then be more painful.
China's best insurance against this is that its budget finances are in better shape than those of any other big economy. China's leaders are acutely aware of the risks of social unrest and they will be willing and able to try to spend their way out of trouble. That makes a sharp downturn in China less likely in the near future. But what about farther ahead?
China's economic success has been based on the essential ingredients of growth: high savings, openness to trade, good education and strong productivity growth. This means its long-term prospects remain strong, although its trend growth rate will inevitably slow as its economy matures and its labour force starts to shrink.
Tao Wang, Bank of America's economist in Beijing, says she is optimistic about China's economy in the short term and the long term, but thinks the medium term looks risky. There is a high chance of a sharp slowdown sometime within the next ten years. The problem with years of rapid growth is that it hides problems that are then painfully exposed when times are hard. But for the time being, the chances are that China can keep sprinting even if America takes to its sick bed. That is good news for the world.
闷声发财的德国“隐形冠军”
作者：英国《金融时报》理查德•米尔恩(Richard Milne)和彼得•马什(Peter Marsh)
2007年9月28日 星期五
过
去10年，西门子(Siemens)、大众汽车(Volkswagen)和戴姆勒克莱斯勒(DaimlerChrysler)的裁员、董事会纠纷及腐败丑闻占据了德国业界新闻的头条。
但更近距离地观察一下德国的产业排名，就可以看到一群比规模更大的同业公司更低调、也更成功的企业，这些就是欧洲最知名管理咨询顾问之一的赫尔曼•西蒙(Hermann Simon)所说的“隐形冠军”(hidden champion)。
它们也许规模较小——收入可能不到30亿欧元——但它们都是所在领域的全球领袖，年增长率达到10%。在亚洲和其它地区的低成本国家彻底改变了制造业经济的10年里，这些隐形冠军——令人奇怪的是——甚至变得更为成功。
“全球化的两大赢家是德国和中国”
这种趋势促使西蒙教授提出了大胆的主张：“全球化的两大赢家是德国和中国。”他的论据是，德国的隐形冠军企业规模较10年前扩大了2.5倍；市场占有率较最大的竞争对手高出2.5倍；创造了100万个就业机会。
西蒙教授表示：“这些小公司是德国经济的核心。它们为所有公司（无论大小）提供了关于如何增长、如何创造就业以及如何创新方面的教训。”西蒙最近出版了《21世纪的隐形冠军》(Hidden Champions in the 21st Century)一书，距离他在畅销书《隐形冠军》(Hidden Champions)中创造这一词汇的时间已过去10年。
这些隐形冠军有着一些不同于其它企业的特点：大力关注能让它们占据统治地位并在高成本的德国继续生产的细分市场；拥有开拓新市场的全球战略，以及“亲力亲为”的创新和生产方式；通常是家族企业或私营企业，以确保连贯性。
193岁的老牌企业
铣齿和磨齿机床制造商Klingelnberg就是一个典型的例子。该公司总部位于科隆附近，拥有193年的历史，已进入家族管理的第7代。现任董事长迪特尔•克林格恩伯格(Diether Klingelnberg)表示，该公司在其所在的多数专业设备市场上都处于统治地位。在任35年后，克林格恩伯格已将管理大权移交给儿子詹(Jan)。
克林格恩伯格将该公司的成功归因于深入研究和快速进入它所确定的市场。“你必须通过与客户或大学交谈，非常非常准确地确定市场，然后大力投资、聘用人手并通过增长迅速提高市场份额，”克林格恩伯格表示，过去10年的机会非常多，“市场规模变得更大：我们的产品现在很容易销往中国、俄罗斯或印度。”
过去10年，为金属制品行业生产激光切割机的全球领军企业Trumpf实现了大幅增长，过去10年的年销售额增长了逾3倍，达到16亿欧元，推动税前利润增长近6倍，至2.04亿欧元。
该公司一直是自主战略的坚定信仰者。上世纪70年代，当Trumpf首次开拓激光切割机市场时，公司监事会主席、过去40年一直是公司所有者的贝特霍尔德•莱宾格(Berthold Leibinger)决定，公司应建立自己的激光切割机生产业务，因为多数已有的设备都不能令人满意。这项决定收到了成效，令Trumpf不仅成为激光切割机供应商，还成为了焊接等领域其它公司激光设备的供应商。
自立对于Kern Microtechnic也很重要。该公司是国防、制药和手表等行业微型零件加工系统的全球领军企业。
去年，这家拥有120名员工的公司实现了1500万欧元的销售额，其中约三分之一来自机器销售，其与部分则来自自己的生产业务。该公司利用这项业务为使用Kern Microtechnic机床的外部客户生产零件。
创新至关重要
Trumpf的莱宾格表示，创新对于该公司的成功至关重要。他提到，该公司决定从机床核心业务拓展到医用激光设备和电子产品，同时保持其市场领军企业的地位。他表示，通过与世界各地的科学家保持紧密联系，并持续对自己的战略方向提出质疑，Trumpf成功做到了这一点。西蒙教授指出，德国公司在沼气、风能和纳米技术等新领域的崛起，表明了它们的反应相当迅速。
发动机和风扇制造商EBM-Papst的负责人汉斯-约亨•拜尔克(Hans-Jochen Beilke)强调管理风格对成功的重要性。该公司规则不多，权力非常分散且组织架构极为简洁——该公司在8周前才聘用了首位公关专家。
西蒙教授表示，权力分散很重要。“隐形冠军不会仅仅对所在的公司分权。它们在进入新领域后还会成立新公司。这样，新公司的负责人就不是中层管理者，好像他在大公司一样，而是一家独立公司的主管；这对于责任非常重要。”
拜尔克表示，EBM-Papst和Trumpf等公司相对于规模更大公司的巨大优势，在于它们决策的速度。
午餐时决定建立俄罗斯子公司
“我们可能会在午餐时讨论是否成立俄罗斯子公司，午餐结束时，事情就定了。但如果是在大众或西门子，那就可能要等上半年才能作出决定，然后再用半年时间与委员会和律师讨论。”
隐形冠军企业的另一特点似乎非常明显，但很难付诸实施：将客户放在公司决策的核心位置。全球领先耳机制造商森海塞尔(Sennheiser)管理委员会主席福尔克尔•巴特尔斯(Volker Bartels)表示，与客户保持联系突显了新的趋势，例如为了赶上手机市场的变化以及在运动中听音乐而必须缩小耳机。
造纸机和涡轮制造商福伊特(Voith)的首席执行官赫姆特•科尔曼(Hermut Kormann)发现，许多公司——尤其是规模较大的上市公司——盲目把注意力放在追逐市场份额方面，而非取悦客户。
“如果客户遇到问题，我们不会说那是他们的错，而不是我们的。我们会去问客户：‘你需要怎样来改正这个错误？'”
东方的召唤：欧美公司铺路中国
隐形冠军企业取得了很大成绩，但它们在21世纪仍然面临挑战。专门研究小公司的管理咨询顾问赫尔曼•西蒙表示：“隐形冠军企业面临的最大挑战在于，把自己从欧美企业转化为欧亚企业。”
西蒙教授认为，这些企业典型的业务比例——欧洲和美国占70%——需要改变为欧洲和中国占70%。
“这将对企业文化造成巨大影响：对一些企业而言，中国已成为第二故乡。”一个例子是钢铁行业机械制造商SMS Demag，该公司逾40%的收入来自中国。
机床制造商Klingelnberg董事长迪特尔•克林格恩伯格认为德国工程师短缺是个更大的问题。“中国现在每年产生30万工程师，而我们只有3万。这个问题不久就会对我们造成影响。”
他承认，这对德国经济的影响可能比对德国企业更大，因为德国企业正在其它国家发展专业技能。Klingelnberg正努力寻找另一个解决办法：本月，该公司通过广告招聘年满60的工程师，以满足该公司对经验丰富的问题解决者的需求。
译者/梁艳裳
阅读本文章英文,请点击 How to find a cutting edge
2007年9月28日 星期五
过
去10年，西门子(Siemens)、大众汽车(Volkswagen)和戴姆勒克莱斯勒(DaimlerChrysler)的裁员、董事会纠纷及腐败丑闻占据了德国业界新闻的头条。
但更近距离地观察一下德国的产业排名，就可以看到一群比规模更大的同业公司更低调、也更成功的企业，这些就是欧洲最知名管理咨询顾问之一的赫尔曼•西蒙(Hermann Simon)所说的“隐形冠军”(hidden champion)。
它们也许规模较小——收入可能不到30亿欧元——但它们都是所在领域的全球领袖，年增长率达到10%。在亚洲和其它地区的低成本国家彻底改变了制造业经济的10年里，这些隐形冠军——令人奇怪的是——甚至变得更为成功。
“全球化的两大赢家是德国和中国”
这种趋势促使西蒙教授提出了大胆的主张：“全球化的两大赢家是德国和中国。”他的论据是，德国的隐形冠军企业规模较10年前扩大了2.5倍；市场占有率较最大的竞争对手高出2.5倍；创造了100万个就业机会。
西蒙教授表示：“这些小公司是德国经济的核心。它们为所有公司（无论大小）提供了关于如何增长、如何创造就业以及如何创新方面的教训。”西蒙最近出版了《21世纪的隐形冠军》(Hidden Champions in the 21st Century)一书，距离他在畅销书《隐形冠军》(Hidden Champions)中创造这一词汇的时间已过去10年。
这些隐形冠军有着一些不同于其它企业的特点：大力关注能让它们占据统治地位并在高成本的德国继续生产的细分市场；拥有开拓新市场的全球战略，以及“亲力亲为”的创新和生产方式；通常是家族企业或私营企业，以确保连贯性。
193岁的老牌企业
铣齿和磨齿机床制造商Klingelnberg就是一个典型的例子。该公司总部位于科隆附近，拥有193年的历史，已进入家族管理的第7代。现任董事长迪特尔•克林格恩伯格(Diether Klingelnberg)表示，该公司在其所在的多数专业设备市场上都处于统治地位。在任35年后，克林格恩伯格已将管理大权移交给儿子詹(Jan)。
克林格恩伯格将该公司的成功归因于深入研究和快速进入它所确定的市场。“你必须通过与客户或大学交谈，非常非常准确地确定市场，然后大力投资、聘用人手并通过增长迅速提高市场份额，”克林格恩伯格表示，过去10年的机会非常多，“市场规模变得更大：我们的产品现在很容易销往中国、俄罗斯或印度。”
过去10年，为金属制品行业生产激光切割机的全球领军企业Trumpf实现了大幅增长，过去10年的年销售额增长了逾3倍，达到16亿欧元，推动税前利润增长近6倍，至2.04亿欧元。
该公司一直是自主战略的坚定信仰者。上世纪70年代，当Trumpf首次开拓激光切割机市场时，公司监事会主席、过去40年一直是公司所有者的贝特霍尔德•莱宾格(Berthold Leibinger)决定，公司应建立自己的激光切割机生产业务，因为多数已有的设备都不能令人满意。这项决定收到了成效，令Trumpf不仅成为激光切割机供应商，还成为了焊接等领域其它公司激光设备的供应商。
自立对于Kern Microtechnic也很重要。该公司是国防、制药和手表等行业微型零件加工系统的全球领军企业。
去年，这家拥有120名员工的公司实现了1500万欧元的销售额，其中约三分之一来自机器销售，其与部分则来自自己的生产业务。该公司利用这项业务为使用Kern Microtechnic机床的外部客户生产零件。
创新至关重要
Trumpf的莱宾格表示，创新对于该公司的成功至关重要。他提到，该公司决定从机床核心业务拓展到医用激光设备和电子产品，同时保持其市场领军企业的地位。他表示，通过与世界各地的科学家保持紧密联系，并持续对自己的战略方向提出质疑，Trumpf成功做到了这一点。西蒙教授指出，德国公司在沼气、风能和纳米技术等新领域的崛起，表明了它们的反应相当迅速。
发动机和风扇制造商EBM-Papst的负责人汉斯-约亨•拜尔克(Hans-Jochen Beilke)强调管理风格对成功的重要性。该公司规则不多，权力非常分散且组织架构极为简洁——该公司在8周前才聘用了首位公关专家。
西蒙教授表示，权力分散很重要。“隐形冠军不会仅仅对所在的公司分权。它们在进入新领域后还会成立新公司。这样，新公司的负责人就不是中层管理者，好像他在大公司一样，而是一家独立公司的主管；这对于责任非常重要。”
拜尔克表示，EBM-Papst和Trumpf等公司相对于规模更大公司的巨大优势，在于它们决策的速度。
午餐时决定建立俄罗斯子公司
“我们可能会在午餐时讨论是否成立俄罗斯子公司，午餐结束时，事情就定了。但如果是在大众或西门子，那就可能要等上半年才能作出决定，然后再用半年时间与委员会和律师讨论。”
隐形冠军企业的另一特点似乎非常明显，但很难付诸实施：将客户放在公司决策的核心位置。全球领先耳机制造商森海塞尔(Sennheiser)管理委员会主席福尔克尔•巴特尔斯(Volker Bartels)表示，与客户保持联系突显了新的趋势，例如为了赶上手机市场的变化以及在运动中听音乐而必须缩小耳机。
造纸机和涡轮制造商福伊特(Voith)的首席执行官赫姆特•科尔曼(Hermut Kormann)发现，许多公司——尤其是规模较大的上市公司——盲目把注意力放在追逐市场份额方面，而非取悦客户。
“如果客户遇到问题，我们不会说那是他们的错，而不是我们的。我们会去问客户：‘你需要怎样来改正这个错误？'”
东方的召唤：欧美公司铺路中国
隐形冠军企业取得了很大成绩，但它们在21世纪仍然面临挑战。专门研究小公司的管理咨询顾问赫尔曼•西蒙表示：“隐形冠军企业面临的最大挑战在于，把自己从欧美企业转化为欧亚企业。”
西蒙教授认为，这些企业典型的业务比例——欧洲和美国占70%——需要改变为欧洲和中国占70%。
“这将对企业文化造成巨大影响：对一些企业而言，中国已成为第二故乡。”一个例子是钢铁行业机械制造商SMS Demag，该公司逾40%的收入来自中国。
机床制造商Klingelnberg董事长迪特尔•克林格恩伯格认为德国工程师短缺是个更大的问题。“中国现在每年产生30万工程师，而我们只有3万。这个问题不久就会对我们造成影响。”
他承认，这对德国经济的影响可能比对德国企业更大，因为德国企业正在其它国家发展专业技能。Klingelnberg正努力寻找另一个解决办法：本月，该公司通过广告招聘年满60的工程师，以满足该公司对经验丰富的问题解决者的需求。
译者/梁艳裳
阅读本文章英文,请点击 How to find a cutting edge
2007年9月22日星期六
Governments as well as people are addicted to the deadly weed
Smoking in Asia
Can't kick the habit
Sep 20th 2007 | BANGKOK
From The Economist print edition
AROUND 700m Asians, mostly men, cannot get through the day without puffing on a cigarette. The habit is thought to kill around 2.3m Asians every year, almost half smoking's global victims. Cases of cancer and other tobacco-related diseases are rising sharply. But health ministries are taking tougher action against smoking. Thailand, which banned it in most public buildings in 2003, is holding hearings on a plan to extend the ban to all places of entertainment. China's press said this month that cigarette makers would be told to put larger health warnings on their packets, including images of skulls, blackened teeth or diseased lungs.
Cigarette consumption in China soared between 1970 and 1990 but has fallen slightly since. There, as elsewhere in Asia, smoking among men is far more common than in the West. The worry, says Burke Fishburn of the World Health Organisation (WHO), is that Asia will follow the Western trend, with more women taking up smoking as men quit. In Vietnam, for example, cigarettes are being peddled to urban women as a “sophisticated” pursuit.
Western tobacco firms, their home markets shrinking, have turned their attention to developing Asia, drawing fire from anti-smoking groups. But, says Mr Fishburn, a bigger worry is the ambitious plan by China's huge state tobacco monopoly to become a big exporter of cut-price smokes to the rest of the region. Thailand, while extending its smoking bans, also plans a giant new factory for its state tobacco firm.
Almost all Asian countries have signed the WHO's tobacco-control treaty, committing themselves to restricting the marketing of cigarettes, curbing smoking in public and helping smokers to quit. But they will struggle to change entrenched social customs. In China, for example, cigarettes are a social lubricant, pressed on guests, whose attempts to decline them are often ignored, or on those from whom one wants a favour, whose acceptance of the cigarette implies the favour will be granted. Tobacco firms are wriggling around the new restrictions. In India, most outdoor advertising has been taken down since it was banned in 2003 but firms are spending heavily on in-store promotional displays, which are still allowed.
Another big obstacle is that Asia's governments are addicted to the huge revenues they earn from both tobacco taxes and the profits of state tobacco firms. Though Indonesia's government is promising to cap cigarette output by 2010, it is the only one in Asia not to have signed the WHO's treaty, claiming it cannot afford to. Tobacco taxes provide about 10% of government revenue and the industry is said to support some 7m people. Chinese officials also worry about the consequences of curbing the tobacco producers.
However, both nicotine-addled countries may be wrong. In each, tobacco taxes are unusually low by world standards. Studies by the World Bank and others suggest that, though raising tobacco taxes succeeds in cutting smoking, it still increases government revenues. Tougher curbs on cigarette smuggling can have the same effect. Tobacco farmers could switch to growing, say, oilseeds, for which demand is booming. And Asia's tobacco firms, in the short term, says Mr Fishburn, need fear neither higher taxes nor tougher advertising bans: they have so much scope to improve their efficiency that they could boost profits even in a shrinking market.
Can't kick the habit
Sep 20th 2007 | BANGKOK
From The Economist print edition
AROUND 700m Asians, mostly men, cannot get through the day without puffing on a cigarette. The habit is thought to kill around 2.3m Asians every year, almost half smoking's global victims. Cases of cancer and other tobacco-related diseases are rising sharply. But health ministries are taking tougher action against smoking. Thailand, which banned it in most public buildings in 2003, is holding hearings on a plan to extend the ban to all places of entertainment. China's press said this month that cigarette makers would be told to put larger health warnings on their packets, including images of skulls, blackened teeth or diseased lungs.
Cigarette consumption in China soared between 1970 and 1990 but has fallen slightly since. There, as elsewhere in Asia, smoking among men is far more common than in the West. The worry, says Burke Fishburn of the World Health Organisation (WHO), is that Asia will follow the Western trend, with more women taking up smoking as men quit. In Vietnam, for example, cigarettes are being peddled to urban women as a “sophisticated” pursuit.
Western tobacco firms, their home markets shrinking, have turned their attention to developing Asia, drawing fire from anti-smoking groups. But, says Mr Fishburn, a bigger worry is the ambitious plan by China's huge state tobacco monopoly to become a big exporter of cut-price smokes to the rest of the region. Thailand, while extending its smoking bans, also plans a giant new factory for its state tobacco firm.
Almost all Asian countries have signed the WHO's tobacco-control treaty, committing themselves to restricting the marketing of cigarettes, curbing smoking in public and helping smokers to quit. But they will struggle to change entrenched social customs. In China, for example, cigarettes are a social lubricant, pressed on guests, whose attempts to decline them are often ignored, or on those from whom one wants a favour, whose acceptance of the cigarette implies the favour will be granted. Tobacco firms are wriggling around the new restrictions. In India, most outdoor advertising has been taken down since it was banned in 2003 but firms are spending heavily on in-store promotional displays, which are still allowed.
Another big obstacle is that Asia's governments are addicted to the huge revenues they earn from both tobacco taxes and the profits of state tobacco firms. Though Indonesia's government is promising to cap cigarette output by 2010, it is the only one in Asia not to have signed the WHO's treaty, claiming it cannot afford to. Tobacco taxes provide about 10% of government revenue and the industry is said to support some 7m people. Chinese officials also worry about the consequences of curbing the tobacco producers.
However, both nicotine-addled countries may be wrong. In each, tobacco taxes are unusually low by world standards. Studies by the World Bank and others suggest that, though raising tobacco taxes succeeds in cutting smoking, it still increases government revenues. Tougher curbs on cigarette smuggling can have the same effect. Tobacco farmers could switch to growing, say, oilseeds, for which demand is booming. And Asia's tobacco firms, in the short term, says Mr Fishburn, need fear neither higher taxes nor tougher advertising bans: they have so much scope to improve their efficiency that they could boost profits even in a shrinking market.
Can China continue to provide low-cost labour in high-tech industries?
Business in China
Talent arbitrage
Sep 20th 2007 | HONG KONG
From The Economist print edition
EVEN in the overheated world of Chinese initial public offerings, the listing and subsequent ballooning of the shares in WuXi PharmaTech has drawn gasps. It began trading on the New York Stock Exchange on August 9th at $14 a share, and the price has since doubled, giving it a market value of $1.65 billion. It would be hard to exaggerate the enthusiasm this suggests: in 2006 WuXi's revenues were only $70m, and its profits $9m.
The market's gusto has three causes. The most obvious is the vertiginous pattern of WuXi's financial performance, albeit from a low base. Revenues grew from $21m in 2004 to $34m in 2005, doubled last year, and may do so again this year. A second cause is the firm's business model. Successful Chinese companies typically have a stake in a government-constrained oligopoly (banks or mobile phones) or a basic industry such as property, steel, or mining. WuXi, by contrast, provides outsourced research for most of the world's big drug companies. It illustrates how China is evolving from producing basic products to sophisticated ones.
Hence the third cause for enthusiasm. China is thought to be an ideal spot for this sort of business. It is not fussy about animal testing unlike, say, India; the government is enthusiastic (providing tax and land incentives, plus the likelihood of intellectual-property protection); and, as in so many other industries in China, labour is cheap. Starting salaries for a PhD are $23,000 a year, compared with $200,000 a year in America, according to UBS, an investment bank. For a big drugs firm, WuXi offers a flexible outsourcing partner that is cheap to use and easy to dump: WuXi's contracts can be cancelled with as little as 30 days' notice.
But is this model sustainable? There are hints of problems to come. WuXi trades on the New York Stock Exchange through an odd depository share tied to a Cayman incorporation. The accounting is a bit odd, but in the initial regulatory filing there is a brief note explaining that profits were cut in half by a share-based compensation plan. That plan is projected to end soon, but another will surely take its place, because compensation costs in China are rising, particularly for firms that employ people whose talents are in demand around the world. WuXi's staff has grown eight-fold since 2003; at the end of May it had 2,000 employees and planned to hire many more. Demand for labour is almost certainly rising faster than supply, so sought-after employees are beginning to demand employment guarantees—and if WuXi and similar firms have to provide them, they will no longer be able to allow their customers to bail out at short notice.
Furthermore, there are questions about the suitability of the outsourcing model in fields such as pharmaceuticals. Companies in the industry are finicky. Quality must be consistently high and the work often involves strict secrecy, all of which argues for keeping it in-house. Recognising China's evolution, several drugs giants have set up their own Chinese operations, but they stress that the quality of employees, not cost, is the main reason, at least in the long term. WuXi may, of course, justify the market's confidence. If it does not, its investors will obviously be aggrieved, but that will not necessarily be bad news for its potential employees, or even for China. It will merely reflect how a glaring inefficiency in the market for world-class talent will have disappeared.
Talent arbitrage
Sep 20th 2007 | HONG KONG
From The Economist print edition
EVEN in the overheated world of Chinese initial public offerings, the listing and subsequent ballooning of the shares in WuXi PharmaTech has drawn gasps. It began trading on the New York Stock Exchange on August 9th at $14 a share, and the price has since doubled, giving it a market value of $1.65 billion. It would be hard to exaggerate the enthusiasm this suggests: in 2006 WuXi's revenues were only $70m, and its profits $9m.
The market's gusto has three causes. The most obvious is the vertiginous pattern of WuXi's financial performance, albeit from a low base. Revenues grew from $21m in 2004 to $34m in 2005, doubled last year, and may do so again this year. A second cause is the firm's business model. Successful Chinese companies typically have a stake in a government-constrained oligopoly (banks or mobile phones) or a basic industry such as property, steel, or mining. WuXi, by contrast, provides outsourced research for most of the world's big drug companies. It illustrates how China is evolving from producing basic products to sophisticated ones.
Hence the third cause for enthusiasm. China is thought to be an ideal spot for this sort of business. It is not fussy about animal testing unlike, say, India; the government is enthusiastic (providing tax and land incentives, plus the likelihood of intellectual-property protection); and, as in so many other industries in China, labour is cheap. Starting salaries for a PhD are $23,000 a year, compared with $200,000 a year in America, according to UBS, an investment bank. For a big drugs firm, WuXi offers a flexible outsourcing partner that is cheap to use and easy to dump: WuXi's contracts can be cancelled with as little as 30 days' notice.
But is this model sustainable? There are hints of problems to come. WuXi trades on the New York Stock Exchange through an odd depository share tied to a Cayman incorporation. The accounting is a bit odd, but in the initial regulatory filing there is a brief note explaining that profits were cut in half by a share-based compensation plan. That plan is projected to end soon, but another will surely take its place, because compensation costs in China are rising, particularly for firms that employ people whose talents are in demand around the world. WuXi's staff has grown eight-fold since 2003; at the end of May it had 2,000 employees and planned to hire many more. Demand for labour is almost certainly rising faster than supply, so sought-after employees are beginning to demand employment guarantees—and if WuXi and similar firms have to provide them, they will no longer be able to allow their customers to bail out at short notice.
Furthermore, there are questions about the suitability of the outsourcing model in fields such as pharmaceuticals. Companies in the industry are finicky. Quality must be consistently high and the work often involves strict secrecy, all of which argues for keeping it in-house. Recognising China's evolution, several drugs giants have set up their own Chinese operations, but they stress that the quality of employees, not cost, is the main reason, at least in the long term. WuXi may, of course, justify the market's confidence. If it does not, its investors will obviously be aggrieved, but that will not necessarily be bad news for its potential employees, or even for China. It will merely reflect how a glaring inefficiency in the market for world-class talent will have disappeared.
2007年9月20日星期四
不吃早餐是导致胆囊疾病的重要原因
生活中，不少人在不知不觉中患上了胆囊结石这种疾病。由于胆囊结石常常伴有胆囊炎，病情一旦发作，病人多会感到剧烈的右上腹绞痛，有时伴有腰部和后背痛，以及恶心、呕吐，严重时冷汗淋漓、坐卧不安、难以忍受。它虽然不是一种恶性疾病，但却严重影响了人们的生活质量。
长期不吃早餐是导致胆囊疾病的重要原因。调查表明，不吃早餐者胆结石的发病率大大高于饮食有规律者，不吃早餐导致空腹时间过长，而空腹时胆汁分泌减少，胆汁中胆酸的含量随之减少，胆汁中的胆固醇就会处于饱和状态，使胆固醇在胆囊中沉积形成结晶，使胆固醇结石越结越大。如果坚持吃早餐，可促进胆汁流出，降低一夜所贮存胆汁的黏滞度，降低患胆结石症的危险性。
预防胆囊炎及胆囊结石，应注意饮食调节，膳食要多样，尽量少吃油腻的食物，饮食偏荤喜甜者，也因脂肪和胆固醇摄入多，易形成胆结石。甜食过多又会促进胰岛素分泌，会加速胆汁中胆固醇的沉积而形成胆结石。此外，生冷、高蛋白、刺激性食物及烈酒等易助湿生热，使胆汁淤积，也应该少食。富含维生素A和维生素C的蔬菜和水果、鱼类及海产类食物则有助于清胆利湿、溶解结石，应该多吃。
预防胆囊炎及胆囊结石，生活要有规律，注意劳逸结合，经常参加体育活动、按时吃早餐、避免发胖、减少妊娠次数等也是非常重要的预防措施。每晚喝一杯牛奶或早餐进食一个煎鸡蛋，可以使胆囊定时收缩，排空，减少胆汁在胆囊中的停留时间。
长期不吃早餐是导致胆囊疾病的重要原因。调查表明，不吃早餐者胆结石的发病率大大高于饮食有规律者，不吃早餐导致空腹时间过长，而空腹时胆汁分泌减少，胆汁中胆酸的含量随之减少，胆汁中的胆固醇就会处于饱和状态，使胆固醇在胆囊中沉积形成结晶，使胆固醇结石越结越大。如果坚持吃早餐，可促进胆汁流出，降低一夜所贮存胆汁的黏滞度，降低患胆结石症的危险性。
预防胆囊炎及胆囊结石，应注意饮食调节，膳食要多样，尽量少吃油腻的食物，饮食偏荤喜甜者，也因脂肪和胆固醇摄入多，易形成胆结石。甜食过多又会促进胰岛素分泌，会加速胆汁中胆固醇的沉积而形成胆结石。此外，生冷、高蛋白、刺激性食物及烈酒等易助湿生热，使胆汁淤积，也应该少食。富含维生素A和维生素C的蔬菜和水果、鱼类及海产类食物则有助于清胆利湿、溶解结石，应该多吃。
预防胆囊炎及胆囊结石，生活要有规律，注意劳逸结合，经常参加体育活动、按时吃早餐、避免发胖、减少妊娠次数等也是非常重要的预防措施。每晚喝一杯牛奶或早餐进食一个煎鸡蛋，可以使胆囊定时收缩，排空，减少胆汁在胆囊中的停留时间。
西门子贿赂门追踪：数十家咨询公司名单曝光
2007年09月20日 07:50 21世纪经济报道
西门子中间人样本调查
陈小莹 张勇 王法争
日前，西门子中国有限公司副总裁白安告诉记者，对所有与西门子相关咨询公司协议进行审查的工作已经在进行中。对相关咨询公司的排查已经成为目前西门子中国公司应对“贿赂门”事件的重点。
在此前德国媒体的报道中，曾指西门子的中国业务有50%都可能与贿赂有关，并指称西门子在中国主要的操作方式是通过空壳公司以及伪造咨询合同从总部套取资金，使得调查以及审计的难度增大。
9月7日，记者看到了一张写有与西门子某主要业务集团有咨询业务往来的公司名单。名单上列出了与该西门子集团有咨询业务的数十家咨询公司，名单全部用英文写就，且写有每一笔咨询业务的名称、金额与用途。
Bernd Eitel(白安)9月14日下午对本报记者陈述了西门子与这些咨询公司之间的业务关系，称这是向他们提供和销售相关建议和指导的商业顾问。
在这张企业名单中，记者发现了有部分资金对应的咨询公司名不见经传，甚至无法通过公开渠道查到其具体的联系电话及地址。
早在9月4日，已经有两家咨询公司进入记者视野，一家英文名为ShanDong JiNan LongShengTai trade Co. Ltd.，另一家英文名为C-P-S Enterprise Development Strategy &； Planning (Beijing) Ltd。
“你提到的这两家公司也在我们的审查名单当中。”西门子中国有限公司公关经理肖伟群14日对本报提出的这两家企业回应说，西门子中国公司也正在调查这两家相关公司，她同时强调并不是只有这两家公司或者说两份合同需要检查，西门子对于咨询公司的排查是全方位的。
“西门子并不是唯一一家有商业咨询协议的公司，许多其他的跨国企业以及本地企业，我猜想可能在这方面比西门子走的更远。”白安说。
济南的“印度工程”
名单显示，上述英文名字为ShanDong JiNan LongShengTai trade Co. Ltd的咨询公司，和西门子某主要业务集团签订了一个名为“project of India”(印度工程)的项目，并分别于2004年6月9日、8月23日、10月27日和2005年2月4日，拿到了西门子支付的四笔咨询费用。
从数额来看，这4笔咨询费用的数额并不引人注目，分别为8万余元、10万余元，10万余元和4万余元，全部咨询费的总额仅为34万余元，支付帐户为建设银行济南市泉城支行。
这个“印度工程”的合同签订于2003年底。从表格来看，这个工程的所有手续齐全，联系人、签字人、负责人在栏目中皆有相应人员的名字拼音，且“业务凭证”一栏显示为“Y”，即该工程拥有相应的凭证。
咨询行业是一个经营范围广泛的行业，一般分为管理咨询、财务咨询、市场营销咨询等几大类。其中，既有麦肯锡等管理咨询巨头，亦有数不清的中小咨询公司专门从事某一些项目咨询。这家公司显然属于后者。
一位不愿意透露姓名的咨询业内人士介绍称，这样的公司在业内为数不少，其经常是很有特长，专注于特殊领域的企业，“一般来说，最主要的服务与公关有关。”
记者通过工商资料搜索，查到一家济南公司与上述英文公司的名称谐音：济南隆盛泰科贸有限公司(以下简称隆盛泰)，其英文名称正是ShanDong JiNan LongShengTai trade Co. Ltd.。
资料显示，此隆盛泰公司的注册资本缴纳同样是在建设银行济南泉城支行办理的，且该专用帐户的末尾10位数与上述“咨询费”的帐户末尾10位数相同(帐号前几位数不同)；且该公司的一名张姓股东的中文名拼音与上述英文名称公司的联系人相同。
工商资料显示，这家公司规模较小，员工仅有10人，注册资金为50万元。该公司有两个自然人股东，各占股56%和44%。简历显示，其文化程度为高中。
隆盛泰成立于2002年3月8日，注册一个月后，其经营范围就发生变更，增加了电力设备、制冷设备等的批发零售和信息咨询服务，减少了炊事用具、通讯设备的批发零售。
记者试图通过该企业的年检报告来核对上述咨询费的帐目情况，但当地工商部门表示，该企业2005年之前的年检报告已经遗失，而2006年的年检报告亦无从查找。
包括114查号台以及网络资料等公开渠道中，都没有这家公司的记录。该公司的工商注册地址位于济南历城区的花园路。记者循着地址发现，该处是济南市历城区政府招待所的所在地，记者在现场遍寻宾馆的几栋楼都没有找到这家公司，且宾馆经营方和其余入驻公司都没有听说过该企业。
隆盛泰的另一个租赁地址在山东省统计干部培训中心，但租赁期亦已过期，也无法找到这家企业。记者反复拨打其留在工商资料上的手机号码和固定电话，接听手机者称该公司电话已经更改，而固定电话已是空号。
目前，隆盛泰处于已过营业期限的状态。它的营业执照显示，这家公司的营业期限至2006年3月到期。但截至目前，该公司没有更新营业执照，亦没有被吊销执照。
到目前为止，西门子方面未向记者确认上述咨询公司的中文名称。
低调的北京公司
C-P-S Enterprise Development Strategy &； Planning (Beijing) Ltd，中文名字是博科曼企业发展策划 ( 北京) 有限公司(以下简称博科曼)。
工商资料显示，博科曼成立于2002年12月，一开始的注册资本为10万元，共有三个自然人股东，分别是李姓、姚姓和刘姓，姚为法定代表人。5年内，其注册资本扩大为630万元，其中，李姓股东出任公司的法定代表人及董事长。工商资料还显示，博科曼的从业人员仅有7人，经营范围主要是企业形象策划、企业管理咨询等。
这家公司在西门子的咨询公司项目名单上频频出现，与西门子有多项业务往来。
“我不清楚你在说的任何情况。”记者拨通了其中刘姓股东的手机，刘承认博科曼与西门子之间有代理的业务关系，但称公司迄今为止并没有被西门子调查，其从事的都是正常代理业务。
博科曼的招聘网页上称，该公司是陕西盛龙实业集团下属的公司，主要与德国的C-P-S公司合作从事工业策划。该介绍同时称，陕西盛龙实业集团则成立于2003年，是一家涉足机电、金融担保、策划、汽车、地产等行业的集团公司。
除招聘网页外，博科曼没有公司网页，没有在114查号台留下联系方式。其工商登记地址为东城区东四十条甲某号的5A级商务大厦，记者在这里找到了其办公室。
该企业没有在门外挂牌，办公室亦没有设前台，进门处设有指纹锁。工商资料显示，在该大厦7楼A706的大约200平方米的办公室是其自有房产，购买时间为2005年11月，总价格为513万余元。
“这类咨询公司是没有必要浮出水面的。”一位大型咨询公司的从业人员介绍说，在国外这样的咨询公司也非常多，不追求规模，一般拥有独特的资源，具有不可替代性。它们通常在医疗、IT等多个领域充当中间人的角色。
西门子中国的公关人员曾表示，记者所看到的咨询公司名单中，绝大部分咨询合同是真实存在的，可能只有部分“有些问题”。
排查正在进行
工商资料显示，博科曼姚姓股东为康沃特电力设备(北京)有限公司的法定代表人，该企业的主营业务是电机制造，员工人数为8人，注册资本金为25万元。
“我们代理西门子的电力设备，也自己组装一些电力设备。”康沃特一位办公室人员称销售员都外出了。
从公开资料来看，该注册资本为25万元，是一家中外合资企业，该公司前台否认其外方合资方为西门子。
康沃特的地址位于北京市亦庄卫星城的经济技术开发区内，在开发区内的这条宏达北路上，与康沃特一墙之隔便是泰世隆机电设备技术(北京)有限公司，其法定代表人为博科曼另一朱姓股东。这家公司的注册资本金为15万元。从事的也是机电设备制造，共有13名员工。
记者致电泰世隆，其员工称，朱总远在国外出差，该公司在很久前曾经代理过西门子的设备。
上述代理公司中，康沃特为中外合资企业，泰世隆为德国独资企业。
关于这两家咨询公司的详细情况，西门子中国的公关经理潘筱颖在9月6日给本报的电子邮件中称，“因为调查正在进行当中，所以不宜回答(这些)问题。”
西门子所辖的公司分布行业广泛，大类有医疗系统集团、自动化与驱动集团、发电集团等等，这些集团都有自成一体的人员和架构。
在本次贿赂门事件之前，西门子2007年第一季度实现了所有业务集团全面盈利，业务在一系列的并购之后正在全面复苏。而本次贿赂门所涉及的借道壳公司以及伪造咨询合同等操作手法，则是给西门子敲响了加强内部控制的警钟。
潘筱颖在给本报的电子邮件中称：“西门子在内控方面一直坚持高标准，强调职业操守和商业道德。既有问题出现，这只能说明我们需要进一步加强合规监管。”
西门子中间人样本调查
陈小莹 张勇 王法争
日前，西门子中国有限公司副总裁白安告诉记者，对所有与西门子相关咨询公司协议进行审查的工作已经在进行中。对相关咨询公司的排查已经成为目前西门子中国公司应对“贿赂门”事件的重点。
在此前德国媒体的报道中，曾指西门子的中国业务有50%都可能与贿赂有关，并指称西门子在中国主要的操作方式是通过空壳公司以及伪造咨询合同从总部套取资金，使得调查以及审计的难度增大。
9月7日，记者看到了一张写有与西门子某主要业务集团有咨询业务往来的公司名单。名单上列出了与该西门子集团有咨询业务的数十家咨询公司，名单全部用英文写就，且写有每一笔咨询业务的名称、金额与用途。
Bernd Eitel(白安)9月14日下午对本报记者陈述了西门子与这些咨询公司之间的业务关系，称这是向他们提供和销售相关建议和指导的商业顾问。
在这张企业名单中，记者发现了有部分资金对应的咨询公司名不见经传，甚至无法通过公开渠道查到其具体的联系电话及地址。
早在9月4日，已经有两家咨询公司进入记者视野，一家英文名为ShanDong JiNan LongShengTai trade Co. Ltd.，另一家英文名为C-P-S Enterprise Development Strategy &； Planning (Beijing) Ltd。
“你提到的这两家公司也在我们的审查名单当中。”西门子中国有限公司公关经理肖伟群14日对本报提出的这两家企业回应说，西门子中国公司也正在调查这两家相关公司，她同时强调并不是只有这两家公司或者说两份合同需要检查，西门子对于咨询公司的排查是全方位的。
“西门子并不是唯一一家有商业咨询协议的公司，许多其他的跨国企业以及本地企业，我猜想可能在这方面比西门子走的更远。”白安说。
济南的“印度工程”
名单显示，上述英文名字为ShanDong JiNan LongShengTai trade Co. Ltd的咨询公司，和西门子某主要业务集团签订了一个名为“project of India”(印度工程)的项目，并分别于2004年6月9日、8月23日、10月27日和2005年2月4日，拿到了西门子支付的四笔咨询费用。
从数额来看，这4笔咨询费用的数额并不引人注目，分别为8万余元、10万余元，10万余元和4万余元，全部咨询费的总额仅为34万余元，支付帐户为建设银行济南市泉城支行。
这个“印度工程”的合同签订于2003年底。从表格来看，这个工程的所有手续齐全，联系人、签字人、负责人在栏目中皆有相应人员的名字拼音，且“业务凭证”一栏显示为“Y”，即该工程拥有相应的凭证。
咨询行业是一个经营范围广泛的行业，一般分为管理咨询、财务咨询、市场营销咨询等几大类。其中，既有麦肯锡等管理咨询巨头，亦有数不清的中小咨询公司专门从事某一些项目咨询。这家公司显然属于后者。
一位不愿意透露姓名的咨询业内人士介绍称，这样的公司在业内为数不少，其经常是很有特长，专注于特殊领域的企业，“一般来说，最主要的服务与公关有关。”
记者通过工商资料搜索，查到一家济南公司与上述英文公司的名称谐音：济南隆盛泰科贸有限公司(以下简称隆盛泰)，其英文名称正是ShanDong JiNan LongShengTai trade Co. Ltd.。
资料显示，此隆盛泰公司的注册资本缴纳同样是在建设银行济南泉城支行办理的，且该专用帐户的末尾10位数与上述“咨询费”的帐户末尾10位数相同(帐号前几位数不同)；且该公司的一名张姓股东的中文名拼音与上述英文名称公司的联系人相同。
工商资料显示，这家公司规模较小，员工仅有10人，注册资金为50万元。该公司有两个自然人股东，各占股56%和44%。简历显示，其文化程度为高中。
隆盛泰成立于2002年3月8日，注册一个月后，其经营范围就发生变更，增加了电力设备、制冷设备等的批发零售和信息咨询服务，减少了炊事用具、通讯设备的批发零售。
记者试图通过该企业的年检报告来核对上述咨询费的帐目情况，但当地工商部门表示，该企业2005年之前的年检报告已经遗失，而2006年的年检报告亦无从查找。
包括114查号台以及网络资料等公开渠道中，都没有这家公司的记录。该公司的工商注册地址位于济南历城区的花园路。记者循着地址发现，该处是济南市历城区政府招待所的所在地，记者在现场遍寻宾馆的几栋楼都没有找到这家公司，且宾馆经营方和其余入驻公司都没有听说过该企业。
隆盛泰的另一个租赁地址在山东省统计干部培训中心，但租赁期亦已过期，也无法找到这家企业。记者反复拨打其留在工商资料上的手机号码和固定电话，接听手机者称该公司电话已经更改，而固定电话已是空号。
目前，隆盛泰处于已过营业期限的状态。它的营业执照显示，这家公司的营业期限至2006年3月到期。但截至目前，该公司没有更新营业执照，亦没有被吊销执照。
到目前为止，西门子方面未向记者确认上述咨询公司的中文名称。
低调的北京公司
C-P-S Enterprise Development Strategy &； Planning (Beijing) Ltd，中文名字是博科曼企业发展策划 ( 北京) 有限公司(以下简称博科曼)。
工商资料显示，博科曼成立于2002年12月，一开始的注册资本为10万元，共有三个自然人股东，分别是李姓、姚姓和刘姓，姚为法定代表人。5年内，其注册资本扩大为630万元，其中，李姓股东出任公司的法定代表人及董事长。工商资料还显示，博科曼的从业人员仅有7人，经营范围主要是企业形象策划、企业管理咨询等。
这家公司在西门子的咨询公司项目名单上频频出现，与西门子有多项业务往来。
“我不清楚你在说的任何情况。”记者拨通了其中刘姓股东的手机，刘承认博科曼与西门子之间有代理的业务关系，但称公司迄今为止并没有被西门子调查，其从事的都是正常代理业务。
博科曼的招聘网页上称，该公司是陕西盛龙实业集团下属的公司，主要与德国的C-P-S公司合作从事工业策划。该介绍同时称，陕西盛龙实业集团则成立于2003年，是一家涉足机电、金融担保、策划、汽车、地产等行业的集团公司。
除招聘网页外，博科曼没有公司网页，没有在114查号台留下联系方式。其工商登记地址为东城区东四十条甲某号的5A级商务大厦，记者在这里找到了其办公室。
该企业没有在门外挂牌，办公室亦没有设前台，进门处设有指纹锁。工商资料显示，在该大厦7楼A706的大约200平方米的办公室是其自有房产，购买时间为2005年11月，总价格为513万余元。
“这类咨询公司是没有必要浮出水面的。”一位大型咨询公司的从业人员介绍说，在国外这样的咨询公司也非常多，不追求规模，一般拥有独特的资源，具有不可替代性。它们通常在医疗、IT等多个领域充当中间人的角色。
西门子中国的公关人员曾表示，记者所看到的咨询公司名单中，绝大部分咨询合同是真实存在的，可能只有部分“有些问题”。
排查正在进行
工商资料显示，博科曼姚姓股东为康沃特电力设备(北京)有限公司的法定代表人，该企业的主营业务是电机制造，员工人数为8人，注册资本金为25万元。
“我们代理西门子的电力设备，也自己组装一些电力设备。”康沃特一位办公室人员称销售员都外出了。
从公开资料来看，该注册资本为25万元，是一家中外合资企业，该公司前台否认其外方合资方为西门子。
康沃特的地址位于北京市亦庄卫星城的经济技术开发区内，在开发区内的这条宏达北路上，与康沃特一墙之隔便是泰世隆机电设备技术(北京)有限公司，其法定代表人为博科曼另一朱姓股东。这家公司的注册资本金为15万元。从事的也是机电设备制造，共有13名员工。
记者致电泰世隆，其员工称，朱总远在国外出差，该公司在很久前曾经代理过西门子的设备。
上述代理公司中，康沃特为中外合资企业，泰世隆为德国独资企业。
关于这两家咨询公司的详细情况，西门子中国的公关经理潘筱颖在9月6日给本报的电子邮件中称，“因为调查正在进行当中，所以不宜回答(这些)问题。”
西门子所辖的公司分布行业广泛，大类有医疗系统集团、自动化与驱动集团、发电集团等等，这些集团都有自成一体的人员和架构。
在本次贿赂门事件之前，西门子2007年第一季度实现了所有业务集团全面盈利，业务在一系列的并购之后正在全面复苏。而本次贿赂门所涉及的借道壳公司以及伪造咨询合同等操作手法，则是给西门子敲响了加强内部控制的警钟。
潘筱颖在给本报的电子邮件中称：“西门子在内控方面一直坚持高标准，强调职业操守和商业道德。既有问题出现，这只能说明我们需要进一步加强合规监管。”
2007年9月15日星期六
Land Rover zu kaufen
Renault-Chef Carlos Ghosn hat kein Interesse am Kauf der Marken Jaguar und Land Rover, für die der US-Autobauer Ford derzeit Käufer sucht.
Silicon Valley is causing a stir in the wireless industry
Mobile phones
From iPhone to gPhone?
Sep 13th 2007 | SAN FRANCISCO
From The Economist print edition
JUST 74 days after launching its iPhone, Apple said this week that it had already sold 1m of the things—a milestone that its previous blockbuster product, the iPod, took almost two years to reach. Its appetite thus whetted, Apple has now cut the iPhone's price from $599 to $399 in a bold grab for the mass market. And yet, to judge by the industry's chatter, the iPhone is already old news. More excitement swirls around rumours that Google, the web-search giant that is Apple's neighbour in Silicon Valley, could enter the market with its own “gPhone”. Google's boss, Eric Schmidt, has already said that the firm plans to bid for a prime slice of American wireless spectrum in a forthcoming auction, something Apple is also said to be considering. In short, both mobile operators and handset-makers could soon be confronted with two of the world's sexiest brands as direct rivals.
Publicly, Apple and Google are being diplomatic so far. The industry is a stool with three legs—network service, devices, and the software and content that goes on them—and “I don't think any player in the ecosystem trying to glue it all together will be very successful,” says Dipchand Nishar, who leads Google's mobile-phone strategy. By this he may simply be conceding the obvious, which is that Google would not build hardware, even if it made the other two legs. (Previous rumours that Google would launch a low-cost personal computer proved to be unfounded.)
But Google seems to be up to something. It bought a company called Android in 2005 that specialises in mobile-phone software. It has Google Talk, a free internet-calling service. In July it bought GrandCentral Communications, a firm that gives users one single phone number for life. And it recently filed a patent application for a new mobile-payment technology.
It would certainly be tempting to tie all these bits together into a new software “platform” for mobile phones and offer it to handset-makers as an alternative to existing smart-phone operating systems such as Symbian, Palm or Microsoft's Windows Mobile. Naturally, Google's search, e-mail and document services would be tightly integrated, along with its advertising technologies, which might pave the way for mobile service that is partly or wholly subsidised by advertising.
As a strategy, this might be just different enough from Apple's to assure harmony with its ally. Mr Schmidt sits on both companies' boards, as does Arthur Levinson, the boss of Genentech, a biotech firm. Google also supplies map and video software for Apple's iPhone. It would suit neither firm to open hostilities. So Google may concentrate on software for cheaper, mass-market devices, leaving Apple to make elegant, high-end hardware.
Hardware aside, the more intriguing possibilities concern the spectrum auction. Next year America's Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the telecoms and media regulator, will sell a band of radio wavelengths that will become available in 2009 as television broadcasters migrate from analogue to digital technology.
The usual buyers for such spectrum would be America's existing telecoms operators, such as AT&T and Verizon. Their “walled garden” model does not allow consumers to choose among handsets, operators and software applications, or even to roam around the open internet. In July, however, Mr Schmidt sent a letter to the FCC in which he pledged to enter the bidding, provided the FCC forces any winner to open up the new network.
The FCC accepted some but not all of Google's advice, so the winner will have to give consumers the freedom to choose handsets and applications. Mr Schmidt declares himself happy enough and says that Google will “be a player in some form”, either alone or in concert with partners. Such as Apple, perhaps?
From iPhone to gPhone?
Sep 13th 2007 | SAN FRANCISCO
From The Economist print edition
JUST 74 days after launching its iPhone, Apple said this week that it had already sold 1m of the things—a milestone that its previous blockbuster product, the iPod, took almost two years to reach. Its appetite thus whetted, Apple has now cut the iPhone's price from $599 to $399 in a bold grab for the mass market. And yet, to judge by the industry's chatter, the iPhone is already old news. More excitement swirls around rumours that Google, the web-search giant that is Apple's neighbour in Silicon Valley, could enter the market with its own “gPhone”. Google's boss, Eric Schmidt, has already said that the firm plans to bid for a prime slice of American wireless spectrum in a forthcoming auction, something Apple is also said to be considering. In short, both mobile operators and handset-makers could soon be confronted with two of the world's sexiest brands as direct rivals.
Publicly, Apple and Google are being diplomatic so far. The industry is a stool with three legs—network service, devices, and the software and content that goes on them—and “I don't think any player in the ecosystem trying to glue it all together will be very successful,” says Dipchand Nishar, who leads Google's mobile-phone strategy. By this he may simply be conceding the obvious, which is that Google would not build hardware, even if it made the other two legs. (Previous rumours that Google would launch a low-cost personal computer proved to be unfounded.)
But Google seems to be up to something. It bought a company called Android in 2005 that specialises in mobile-phone software. It has Google Talk, a free internet-calling service. In July it bought GrandCentral Communications, a firm that gives users one single phone number for life. And it recently filed a patent application for a new mobile-payment technology.
It would certainly be tempting to tie all these bits together into a new software “platform” for mobile phones and offer it to handset-makers as an alternative to existing smart-phone operating systems such as Symbian, Palm or Microsoft's Windows Mobile. Naturally, Google's search, e-mail and document services would be tightly integrated, along with its advertising technologies, which might pave the way for mobile service that is partly or wholly subsidised by advertising.
As a strategy, this might be just different enough from Apple's to assure harmony with its ally. Mr Schmidt sits on both companies' boards, as does Arthur Levinson, the boss of Genentech, a biotech firm. Google also supplies map and video software for Apple's iPhone. It would suit neither firm to open hostilities. So Google may concentrate on software for cheaper, mass-market devices, leaving Apple to make elegant, high-end hardware.
Hardware aside, the more intriguing possibilities concern the spectrum auction. Next year America's Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the telecoms and media regulator, will sell a band of radio wavelengths that will become available in 2009 as television broadcasters migrate from analogue to digital technology.
The usual buyers for such spectrum would be America's existing telecoms operators, such as AT&T and Verizon. Their “walled garden” model does not allow consumers to choose among handsets, operators and software applications, or even to roam around the open internet. In July, however, Mr Schmidt sent a letter to the FCC in which he pledged to enter the bidding, provided the FCC forces any winner to open up the new network.
The FCC accepted some but not all of Google's advice, so the winner will have to give consumers the freedom to choose handsets and applications. Mr Schmidt declares himself happy enough and says that Google will “be a player in some form”, either alone or in concert with partners. Such as Apple, perhaps?
The bullish mood in Frankfurt belies an uncertain future for the car giants
The car industry
The road ahead
Sep 13th 2007 | FRANKFURT
From The Economist print edition
A CASUAL visitor to this week's sprawling motor show in Frankfurt would conclude that the global car industry is robustly self-confident as it churns out new models to fill every niche of consumer demand and forges ahead with the green technologies that will reconcile the car with the future health of the planet. The reality is different. There is little or no growth in the carmakers' oldest markets. Demand in western Europe is flat; North American sales, hit by fall-out from the collapse of subprime lending, are on the brink of recession; and Japanese sales are shrinking as the population declines.
Everybody agrees that an industry needing growth must look to emerging markets such as China, India, Russia and Brazil. Carlos Ghosn, the boss of the Renault-Nissan alliance (see article), points out that sales in those countries doubled between 1999 and 2006. Now that these emerging markets have started to matter, the established carmakers are racing to find local partners and produce vehicles that will appeal to new buyers in Asia and South America. Volkswagen (VW), a latecomer to the party, this week announced the Up!, a €6,000 ($8,300) small car for emerging markets with a rear-mounted engine that harks back to the original VW Beetle.
Another danger for the established carmakers is the rate at which they are transferring technology to joint-venture partners as the price of market access. Some of those partners are turning into formidable competitors themselves, with ambitions both in their own markets and further afield. For the moment the threat is limited. Chinese and Indian firms will struggle to meet safety and emission standards in America, Japan and the European Union. But that will not hold them up for ever.
It is not just the scramble for customers in new markets that will divide the industry into winners and losers. So will the imposition of stricter emissions standards and ever more punitive taxes on polluting vehicles. Just now the industry is trying to have it both ways. It is arguing furiously against the European Commission's goal of reducing average fleet emissions to 130 grams of CO2 per kilometre by 2012, and the new fuel-economy rules being drawn up in America. But at the same time it is talking a green game and showing off new fuel-sipping technologies.
Several manufacturers, such as Ford Europe and VW, have introduced high-economy sub-brands across their ranges. VW's green range is called BlueMotion, and this week Ford announced a similar idea called ECOnetic. Using affordable technologies such as improved aerodynamics, various electronic tweaks and low-resistance tyres, Ford's new Focus and VW's new Polo have CO2 emissions comparable to Toyota's Prius hybrid. The southern European producers, Renault, PSA Peugeot Citroën and Fiat, already make large numbers of small cars with efficient diesel engines. But greenery poses more of a problem for BMW, Mercedes, Audi and Porsche. They are exploring every possibility—Porsche is even making a hybrid version of its indecently rapid Cayenne SUV—but they may simply have to make smaller, less powerful cars in future.
As to which of the green technologies will dominate in the future, the mantra of most car executives is that it will vary from market to market. In Europe ever-cleaner diesels lead the way and hybrids have yet to make much headway. In America, clean-air regulations that have blocked diesel cars are due to get tighter still. “I have the gravest doubts whether diesel will ever be a solution in the US,” says Bob Lutz, vice-chairman of General Motors (GM).
Accordingly, GM plans to produce a wide range of mainstream vehicles using the E-Flex powertrain that first appeared in its Volt concept car in Detroit earlier this year. At Frankfurt GM's Opel unit showed a small diesel-electric hybrid with a battery that can be recharged from the mains to give an electric-only range of 40 miles. On longer trips, the diesel engine acts as a generator to recharge the battery, rather than driving the wheels directly. Toyota, in contrast, relies on a more complex hybrid architecture in which both the petrol engine and the electric motor can drive the wheels. Mr Lutz says he believes that consumers will overwhelmingly prefer GM's approach. Place your bets.
The road ahead
Sep 13th 2007 | FRANKFURT
From The Economist print edition
A CASUAL visitor to this week's sprawling motor show in Frankfurt would conclude that the global car industry is robustly self-confident as it churns out new models to fill every niche of consumer demand and forges ahead with the green technologies that will reconcile the car with the future health of the planet. The reality is different. There is little or no growth in the carmakers' oldest markets. Demand in western Europe is flat; North American sales, hit by fall-out from the collapse of subprime lending, are on the brink of recession; and Japanese sales are shrinking as the population declines.
Everybody agrees that an industry needing growth must look to emerging markets such as China, India, Russia and Brazil. Carlos Ghosn, the boss of the Renault-Nissan alliance (see article), points out that sales in those countries doubled between 1999 and 2006. Now that these emerging markets have started to matter, the established carmakers are racing to find local partners and produce vehicles that will appeal to new buyers in Asia and South America. Volkswagen (VW), a latecomer to the party, this week announced the Up!, a €6,000 ($8,300) small car for emerging markets with a rear-mounted engine that harks back to the original VW Beetle.
Another danger for the established carmakers is the rate at which they are transferring technology to joint-venture partners as the price of market access. Some of those partners are turning into formidable competitors themselves, with ambitions both in their own markets and further afield. For the moment the threat is limited. Chinese and Indian firms will struggle to meet safety and emission standards in America, Japan and the European Union. But that will not hold them up for ever.
It is not just the scramble for customers in new markets that will divide the industry into winners and losers. So will the imposition of stricter emissions standards and ever more punitive taxes on polluting vehicles. Just now the industry is trying to have it both ways. It is arguing furiously against the European Commission's goal of reducing average fleet emissions to 130 grams of CO2 per kilometre by 2012, and the new fuel-economy rules being drawn up in America. But at the same time it is talking a green game and showing off new fuel-sipping technologies.
Several manufacturers, such as Ford Europe and VW, have introduced high-economy sub-brands across their ranges. VW's green range is called BlueMotion, and this week Ford announced a similar idea called ECOnetic. Using affordable technologies such as improved aerodynamics, various electronic tweaks and low-resistance tyres, Ford's new Focus and VW's new Polo have CO2 emissions comparable to Toyota's Prius hybrid. The southern European producers, Renault, PSA Peugeot Citroën and Fiat, already make large numbers of small cars with efficient diesel engines. But greenery poses more of a problem for BMW, Mercedes, Audi and Porsche. They are exploring every possibility—Porsche is even making a hybrid version of its indecently rapid Cayenne SUV—but they may simply have to make smaller, less powerful cars in future.
As to which of the green technologies will dominate in the future, the mantra of most car executives is that it will vary from market to market. In Europe ever-cleaner diesels lead the way and hybrids have yet to make much headway. In America, clean-air regulations that have blocked diesel cars are due to get tighter still. “I have the gravest doubts whether diesel will ever be a solution in the US,” says Bob Lutz, vice-chairman of General Motors (GM).
Accordingly, GM plans to produce a wide range of mainstream vehicles using the E-Flex powertrain that first appeared in its Volt concept car in Detroit earlier this year. At Frankfurt GM's Opel unit showed a small diesel-electric hybrid with a battery that can be recharged from the mains to give an electric-only range of 40 miles. On longer trips, the diesel engine acts as a generator to recharge the battery, rather than driving the wheels directly. Toyota, in contrast, relies on a more complex hybrid architecture in which both the petrol engine and the electric motor can drive the wheels. Mr Lutz says he believes that consumers will overwhelmingly prefer GM's approach. Place your bets.
Not losing Facebook in China
Sep 13th 2007 | SHANGHAI
From The Economist print edition
Social-networking and video-sharing sites are booming
XIAONEI.COM does not just look like Facebook, the booming social-networking website. As well as borrowing its design, it has also lifted its strategy and transplanted it to China. It is not alone. All the big “Web 2.0” sites—those that let people share information, collaborate and link up with friends—have many Chinese knockoffs. YouTube, the video-sharing site that is now part of Google, has over 200 copycats in China, about 10% of them backed by venture capital, says Isaac Mao, an internet investor and a Chinese blogging pioneer.
And no wonder, since most Web 2.0 sites do not have official Chinese versions. So enterprising start-ups simply copy the ideas and graphics, and localise them to suit Chinese tastes. The Chinese market is now so saturated that it is much harder to raise money than it was a year ago, says Gary Wang, the boss of Tudou—a site known as the “Chinese YouTube”. This is a good thing, he says, because it means investors are being much more discriminating.
The surge of interest has created some problems, however. There is not enough bandwidth or data-centre capacity to keep up with demand, says Kaiser Kuo, director for digital strategy at Ogilvy China, an advertising agency. This makes some websites painfully slow to use. Another problem is that traffic does not flow smoothly between the networks of China Telecom and China Netcom, the two fixed-line telecoms operators. Many firms deal with this by setting up “mirrors” of their sites.
Cultural compatibility is much less of a problem, given the extent to which Chinese society is built on personal connections, or guanxi. Online social-networking is a logical extension of such relationships, says Allison Luong of Pearl Research, an internet consultancy.
Some Chinese start-ups, such as Anothr.com and douban.net, are now seeking customers outside China with English-language websites. Others hope to do deals with foreign Web 2.0 firms. One of Mr Mao's investments is in Wealink, a Chinese site inspired by LinkedIn that has around 1.2m users. It has attracted the attention of the original LinkedIn, and the two firms have discussed a tie-up. “Who knows?” says a smiling Mr Mao. “Maybe in the future we'll see Wealink buy LinkedIn.”
From The Economist print edition
Social-networking and video-sharing sites are booming
XIAONEI.COM does not just look like Facebook, the booming social-networking website. As well as borrowing its design, it has also lifted its strategy and transplanted it to China. It is not alone. All the big “Web 2.0” sites—those that let people share information, collaborate and link up with friends—have many Chinese knockoffs. YouTube, the video-sharing site that is now part of Google, has over 200 copycats in China, about 10% of them backed by venture capital, says Isaac Mao, an internet investor and a Chinese blogging pioneer.
And no wonder, since most Web 2.0 sites do not have official Chinese versions. So enterprising start-ups simply copy the ideas and graphics, and localise them to suit Chinese tastes. The Chinese market is now so saturated that it is much harder to raise money than it was a year ago, says Gary Wang, the boss of Tudou—a site known as the “Chinese YouTube”. This is a good thing, he says, because it means investors are being much more discriminating.
The surge of interest has created some problems, however. There is not enough bandwidth or data-centre capacity to keep up with demand, says Kaiser Kuo, director for digital strategy at Ogilvy China, an advertising agency. This makes some websites painfully slow to use. Another problem is that traffic does not flow smoothly between the networks of China Telecom and China Netcom, the two fixed-line telecoms operators. Many firms deal with this by setting up “mirrors” of their sites.
Cultural compatibility is much less of a problem, given the extent to which Chinese society is built on personal connections, or guanxi. Online social-networking is a logical extension of such relationships, says Allison Luong of Pearl Research, an internet consultancy.
Some Chinese start-ups, such as Anothr.com and douban.net, are now seeking customers outside China with English-language websites. Others hope to do deals with foreign Web 2.0 firms. One of Mr Mao's investments is in Wealink, a Chinese site inspired by LinkedIn that has around 1.2m users. It has attracted the attention of the original LinkedIn, and the two firms have discussed a tie-up. “Who knows?” says a smiling Mr Mao. “Maybe in the future we'll see Wealink buy LinkedIn.”
女银行家的约会战术
英国《金融时报》中文网专栏作家谁谁谁
2007年9月12日 星期三
对一个女银行家来说，生活中最苦恼的事情之一莫过于找不出时间来约会。白天处理公司的事，晚上需要和欧美沟通，夜里总得留时间睡觉吧。于是有的女银行家放弃了个人感情生活，有的放弃了银行家这个高度挑战性的职业，还有的，什么都不想放弃，而是没有时间创造时间也要约会。
一位新加坡女银行家不仅家庭圆满，而且居然于在职期间生了四个孩子。当初她和先生约会时的时间战术如下：每晚6点准时下班赴约，晚11点赶回公司处理事务，凌晨3点回家睡觉，第二天早9点准时出现在办公室，制造出一种她是标准朝九晚五能够准时下班回家的白领的假象。当然，这一切随着二人步入婚姻而渐渐真相毕露。然而生米已煮成熟饭，况且两人的感情也日久弥笃，这时妻子的因公晚归也慢慢被归入可以接纳的范畴。
同样的时间战术还有一位女作家的案例。某香港女作家在结婚生子后，很长一段时间内为写作与成为贤妻良母无法两全而苦恼。白天在家照顾孩子，晚上又要陪老公。终于，她寻找到一条两全的道路：每天凌晨三点起床写作，写到六点，上床睡个回笼觉，七点左右和家人一同起来。一年后她的新书出版时，连她的老公都纳闷：你到底是什么时候写的呀？
这些八卦告诉我们，事在人为。当然，总有牺牲的，完整的睡眠被打破、睡眠时间减短，绝对不是什么舒服的事，但也许比扔掉写作或者扔掉老公舒服点。
与女银行家和女作家相比，一岁孩子的母亲、我的一位女朋友对生活永远只有抱怨。孩子时时刻刻在哭，老公总是什么忙也帮不上，家里的阿姨永远笨手笨脚，父母来帮忙却越帮越忙，这一系列抱怨的结果最终导致，我们朋友聚会的时候她永远没空过来，要么那天是新阿姨上班的第一天，她需要临场指导，要么公司要加班，要么孩子有点不舒服……约了她几次都没空后，大家就习惯了聚会时把她默认为缺席。于是她的抱怨就多加了一条：朋友们喜新厌旧，再也想不起她了。
其实她最该抱怨的是她自己，除了她对生活诸多细节的苛刻要求外，她的老公、她的朋友，她的父母，她家里的阿姨，都处于可以被牺牲的行列。如果是她处在女银行家或者女作家的位置，大概要去撞墙了。
(作者电子邮箱: sheisheishei@21cn.com)
2007年9月12日 星期三
对一个女银行家来说，生活中最苦恼的事情之一莫过于找不出时间来约会。白天处理公司的事，晚上需要和欧美沟通，夜里总得留时间睡觉吧。于是有的女银行家放弃了个人感情生活，有的放弃了银行家这个高度挑战性的职业，还有的，什么都不想放弃，而是没有时间创造时间也要约会。
一位新加坡女银行家不仅家庭圆满，而且居然于在职期间生了四个孩子。当初她和先生约会时的时间战术如下：每晚6点准时下班赴约，晚11点赶回公司处理事务，凌晨3点回家睡觉，第二天早9点准时出现在办公室，制造出一种她是标准朝九晚五能够准时下班回家的白领的假象。当然，这一切随着二人步入婚姻而渐渐真相毕露。然而生米已煮成熟饭，况且两人的感情也日久弥笃，这时妻子的因公晚归也慢慢被归入可以接纳的范畴。
同样的时间战术还有一位女作家的案例。某香港女作家在结婚生子后，很长一段时间内为写作与成为贤妻良母无法两全而苦恼。白天在家照顾孩子，晚上又要陪老公。终于，她寻找到一条两全的道路：每天凌晨三点起床写作，写到六点，上床睡个回笼觉，七点左右和家人一同起来。一年后她的新书出版时，连她的老公都纳闷：你到底是什么时候写的呀？
这些八卦告诉我们，事在人为。当然，总有牺牲的，完整的睡眠被打破、睡眠时间减短，绝对不是什么舒服的事，但也许比扔掉写作或者扔掉老公舒服点。
与女银行家和女作家相比，一岁孩子的母亲、我的一位女朋友对生活永远只有抱怨。孩子时时刻刻在哭，老公总是什么忙也帮不上，家里的阿姨永远笨手笨脚，父母来帮忙却越帮越忙，这一系列抱怨的结果最终导致，我们朋友聚会的时候她永远没空过来，要么那天是新阿姨上班的第一天，她需要临场指导，要么公司要加班，要么孩子有点不舒服……约了她几次都没空后，大家就习惯了聚会时把她默认为缺席。于是她的抱怨就多加了一条：朋友们喜新厌旧，再也想不起她了。
其实她最该抱怨的是她自己，除了她对生活诸多细节的苛刻要求外，她的老公、她的朋友，她的父母，她家里的阿姨，都处于可以被牺牲的行列。如果是她处在女银行家或者女作家的位置，大概要去撞墙了。
(作者电子邮箱: sheisheishei@21cn.com)
Muhammad cartoons in Scandinavia
Gone to the dogs
Sep 13th 2007 | STOCKHOLM
From The Economist print edition
Is it déjà vu all over again?
FOR the past few weeks Sweden has been poised for a replay of the Muhammad cartoon row in Denmark in 2006. Nerikes Allehanda, a provincial newspaper, published a crude sketch of the head of the prophet on the body of a dog. But despite a few flag-burning incidents in Muslim countries, some noisy protests in Sweden and a clutch of reprimands by Muslim governments, the response has so far been muted.
The affairs had similar incendiary ingredients: rude newspaper cartoons, outraged Muslims and secular Scandinavians insisting on freedom of speech. Yet there were also differences. Sweden had the benefit of hindsight. Denmark's sluggish response was a textbook case of muddled policy. The Danish case meant that the Swedes were acutely aware of the cartoons' inflammatory potential from the moment they appeared.
Fredrik Reinfeldt, the Swedish prime minister, waited weeks, not months, to publish an official statement that both defended free speech and expressed regret that people had been offended. And unlike Denmark's prime minister, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, who haughtily declined to meet a delegation of Muslim ambassadors, Mr Reinfeldt took the initiative to invite them in for a chat.
The political context is also different. The “foreigner problem” has topped Denmark's agenda for six years; an anti-immigration party is the government's bosom ally. In Sweden there is more concern about jobs and money. And Sweden is a more inclusive place (the minister for integration is from Burundi).
And then there is the genesis of the cartoons. The Danish ones were the work of a dozen artists, commissioned by a big newspaper. The Swedish cartoons are by one man: Lars Vilks, a former art professor and maverick. Before now, his most famous creation was Ladonia, a fantasy country in a Swedish nature reserve. Mr Vilks claims that over 3,000 Pakistanis applied for citizenship of Ladonia in 2002 alone. All the more reason not to take him too seriously.
Sep 13th 2007 | STOCKHOLM
From The Economist print edition
Is it déjà vu all over again?
FOR the past few weeks Sweden has been poised for a replay of the Muhammad cartoon row in Denmark in 2006. Nerikes Allehanda, a provincial newspaper, published a crude sketch of the head of the prophet on the body of a dog. But despite a few flag-burning incidents in Muslim countries, some noisy protests in Sweden and a clutch of reprimands by Muslim governments, the response has so far been muted.
The affairs had similar incendiary ingredients: rude newspaper cartoons, outraged Muslims and secular Scandinavians insisting on freedom of speech. Yet there were also differences. Sweden had the benefit of hindsight. Denmark's sluggish response was a textbook case of muddled policy. The Danish case meant that the Swedes were acutely aware of the cartoons' inflammatory potential from the moment they appeared.
Fredrik Reinfeldt, the Swedish prime minister, waited weeks, not months, to publish an official statement that both defended free speech and expressed regret that people had been offended. And unlike Denmark's prime minister, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, who haughtily declined to meet a delegation of Muslim ambassadors, Mr Reinfeldt took the initiative to invite them in for a chat.
The political context is also different. The “foreigner problem” has topped Denmark's agenda for six years; an anti-immigration party is the government's bosom ally. In Sweden there is more concern about jobs and money. And Sweden is a more inclusive place (the minister for integration is from Burundi).
And then there is the genesis of the cartoons. The Danish ones were the work of a dozen artists, commissioned by a big newspaper. The Swedish cartoons are by one man: Lars Vilks, a former art professor and maverick. Before now, his most famous creation was Ladonia, a fantasy country in a Swedish nature reserve. Mr Vilks claims that over 3,000 Pakistanis applied for citizenship of Ladonia in 2002 alone. All the more reason not to take him too seriously.
2007年9月2日星期日
高清摄像机挑战化妆术？
作者：英国《金融时报》埃玛•希尔(Emma Hill)
2007年8月31日 星期五
当上世纪90年代中期高清电视最早在美国面市时，这款产品在洛杉矶女星圈子里引发了非常普遍的不安。
化妆师克伦(Karen Kawahara)回忆道：“我经常与女星们打交道，举办一些媒体招待会。一些记者会带着高清（摄像机）前来（采访她们），她们会说自己没做好准备。其实她们对这种技术非常紧张。”克伦曾担任电视剧《俏妈新上路》(The New Adventures Of Old Christine)[由出演《宋飞正传》(Seinfeld)的朱丽娅•路易斯-德莱弗斯(Julia Louis-Dreyfus)主演]的化妆师。
明星们当然知道科技会将她们的细节暴露无遗，每个瑕疵、皱纹、毛孔和痘痘都会变得清晰可见。其原因是高清电视的分辨率达到了传统电视的4倍，有些类似于普通镜子与放大镜的差别。但是，尽管起初高清电视让女星们忧心忡忡，但新的摄影技术给化妆行业带来了可喜的连锁效应：它不仅使电影电视行业更加注重化妆要求，而且还要求研发新产品来做这项工作。
对化妆的主要要求，是看上去自然和没有瑕疵——突然之间，处于聚光灯下的女星要求与那些职业女性变得一模一样。
克伦表示：“我总是说，如果我本人觉得好，那么在电视上也会看上去不错。”化妆手法柔和颇有必要。因此，如果需要用柔和色彩来弥补为正常摄影而使用的灯光，那么必须使用与肤色完全吻合的粉底。
化妆手法还必须小心谨慎。英国化妆师李•皮克罗夫特(Lee Pycroft)解释道：“从理论上讲，你必须明确每个细微的瑕疵。”他曾与内奥米•沃兹(Naomi Watts)和凯特•布兰切特(Cate Blanchett)等女星合作过。
当然，归根结底，对于好莱坞的小明星来说，这些进展已影响到现实生活中女性的购物选择，而针对新电影制式的化妆技术也将惠及消费者。首先是粉底：对于荧屏形象来说，粉底必须看上去让人察觉不出。
为实现这一目的，M.A.C.致力于研制超微的粉底颗粒（使用一项名为“气流研磨”的技术，将粉末磨至达到显微镜的规格——3至6微米之间），以研发出超细和透明的粉底。这种粉底能实现与皮肤的完美结合，例如柔光润泽粉底（Mineralize Satinfinish Foundation，18.50英镑）。Prescriptives、Chanel和Laura Mercier也研制出了看上去像皮肤那么完美的粉底。例如，Laura Mercier的无油清秀粉底（Oil-Free Foundation，30英镑）效果非常透明，需要时可以分层上妆，Chanel Vitalumiere的闪亮粉底（25英镑）给皮肤增加光泽，但又不会过分油光。
尽管不是专为高清技术而设计，但新款遮瑕笔（这款价格适中的产品灵感来自专业人士用的遮瑕刷）是一种应对高清技术的宝贵化妆工具。它们在实际生活中也非常好用。值得推荐的两款产品是娇兰(Guerlain)的“焕颜遮瑕笔”(Precious Light，24英镑）和“完美面庞遮瑕粉刷”(By Terry Light Expert，38英镑，带一个粉底和一只遮瑕刷)，而倩碧(Clinique)的CX红色修正笔(CX Red Colour Corrector，28英镑)，也可以改善高清技术拍摄中常见的泛红问题。
腮红和眼影的质地同样也在得到改善，显现出更为自然和润泽的效果。M.A.C化妆技术专家迪安•鲁德(Dean Rudd)表示：“高清电视上会出现反光。” M.A.C使用同样的“气流研磨”程序对粉末进行加工，研发出透明腮红(Sheertone Blush，13.50英镑)和Velux眼影(Velux Eyeshadow，10英镑)——这两款产品都可以增加皮肤的光泽，而不是泛油光或加重色彩。此外，眼影不会像过去那样使皱纹看上去明显，因为眼影的质地更为均匀。鲁德表示：“它看上去更加自然，效果更好。”
译者/何黎
《生活时尚》
2007年8月31日 星期五
当上世纪90年代中期高清电视最早在美国面市时，这款产品在洛杉矶女星圈子里引发了非常普遍的不安。
化妆师克伦(Karen Kawahara)回忆道：“我经常与女星们打交道，举办一些媒体招待会。一些记者会带着高清（摄像机）前来（采访她们），她们会说自己没做好准备。其实她们对这种技术非常紧张。”克伦曾担任电视剧《俏妈新上路》(The New Adventures Of Old Christine)[由出演《宋飞正传》(Seinfeld)的朱丽娅•路易斯-德莱弗斯(Julia Louis-Dreyfus)主演]的化妆师。
明星们当然知道科技会将她们的细节暴露无遗，每个瑕疵、皱纹、毛孔和痘痘都会变得清晰可见。其原因是高清电视的分辨率达到了传统电视的4倍，有些类似于普通镜子与放大镜的差别。但是，尽管起初高清电视让女星们忧心忡忡，但新的摄影技术给化妆行业带来了可喜的连锁效应：它不仅使电影电视行业更加注重化妆要求，而且还要求研发新产品来做这项工作。
对化妆的主要要求，是看上去自然和没有瑕疵——突然之间，处于聚光灯下的女星要求与那些职业女性变得一模一样。
克伦表示：“我总是说，如果我本人觉得好，那么在电视上也会看上去不错。”化妆手法柔和颇有必要。因此，如果需要用柔和色彩来弥补为正常摄影而使用的灯光，那么必须使用与肤色完全吻合的粉底。
化妆手法还必须小心谨慎。英国化妆师李•皮克罗夫特(Lee Pycroft)解释道：“从理论上讲，你必须明确每个细微的瑕疵。”他曾与内奥米•沃兹(Naomi Watts)和凯特•布兰切特(Cate Blanchett)等女星合作过。
当然，归根结底，对于好莱坞的小明星来说，这些进展已影响到现实生活中女性的购物选择，而针对新电影制式的化妆技术也将惠及消费者。首先是粉底：对于荧屏形象来说，粉底必须看上去让人察觉不出。
为实现这一目的，M.A.C.致力于研制超微的粉底颗粒（使用一项名为“气流研磨”的技术，将粉末磨至达到显微镜的规格——3至6微米之间），以研发出超细和透明的粉底。这种粉底能实现与皮肤的完美结合，例如柔光润泽粉底（Mineralize Satinfinish Foundation，18.50英镑）。Prescriptives、Chanel和Laura Mercier也研制出了看上去像皮肤那么完美的粉底。例如，Laura Mercier的无油清秀粉底（Oil-Free Foundation，30英镑）效果非常透明，需要时可以分层上妆，Chanel Vitalumiere的闪亮粉底（25英镑）给皮肤增加光泽，但又不会过分油光。
尽管不是专为高清技术而设计，但新款遮瑕笔（这款价格适中的产品灵感来自专业人士用的遮瑕刷）是一种应对高清技术的宝贵化妆工具。它们在实际生活中也非常好用。值得推荐的两款产品是娇兰(Guerlain)的“焕颜遮瑕笔”(Precious Light，24英镑）和“完美面庞遮瑕粉刷”(By Terry Light Expert，38英镑，带一个粉底和一只遮瑕刷)，而倩碧(Clinique)的CX红色修正笔(CX Red Colour Corrector，28英镑)，也可以改善高清技术拍摄中常见的泛红问题。
腮红和眼影的质地同样也在得到改善，显现出更为自然和润泽的效果。M.A.C化妆技术专家迪安•鲁德(Dean Rudd)表示：“高清电视上会出现反光。” M.A.C使用同样的“气流研磨”程序对粉末进行加工，研发出透明腮红(Sheertone Blush，13.50英镑)和Velux眼影(Velux Eyeshadow，10英镑)——这两款产品都可以增加皮肤的光泽，而不是泛油光或加重色彩。此外，眼影不会像过去那样使皱纹看上去明显，因为眼影的质地更为均匀。鲁德表示：“它看上去更加自然，效果更好。”
译者/何黎
《生活时尚》
有2000个手袋的女人
作者：英国《金融时报》 保拉•魏德黛格(Paula Weidegger)
2007年8月31日 星期五
你曾认为芭芭拉•艾米尔•布莱克(Barbara Amiel Black)有手袋是件坏事，她的爱马仕(Hermès)Birkin包和凯莉包(Kelly)有两位数之多。这种现代苦恼使我们一看到带有Chloé、巴黎世家(Balenciaga)、迪奥(Dior)、威登(Vuitton)和香奈儿(Chanel)等标识的小背包、购物袋、包装袋和无带皮包，就充满欲望。结果，当我们将另一个特大号的华丽手包提回家时，却发现自己不断“膨胀”的衣橱已经塞得太满了。
然而，实际上，看到这篇文章的人或许不太知道荷兰古董商亨德里克耶•伊福(Hendrikje Ivo)，在过去35年中，她染上了一种严重的手袋瘾，以至于今年夏初在阿姆斯特丹开放了一个博物馆，专门展示她的藏品。
伊福说：“手袋是一个女人的秘密抽屉，”她试图解释自己的这种痴迷（这难以解释，但对我们大多数人而言，又是可以理解的）。“它总是与她如影随形。”
伊福向手袋博物馆Tassenmuseum捐赠了2000多个手袋，这么多移动抽屉哪怕对行动最隐秘的玛塔•哈里(Mata Hari)（电影《魔女玛塔》的主人公，是一位德国女间谍——译者注）式女人也足够了，但伊福还保留了另外五、六十个手袋供私人使用。这没什么。重要的是，当我们所有人都进入夏季戒瘾的心境时，伊福的做法不但给所有钟爱手袋的旅行者一颗消除内疚感的定心丸，还是一扇无价之窗，显示了非常现代的消费趋势（诚实地讲，对于在思索秋冬购物行动的所有人而言，这是个不错的回顾）。
这家博物馆是座双面开门的豪华建筑，17世纪这里曾是一家银行，建筑内部有原创的手绘顶棚，面朝阿姆斯特丹最美的运河之一——Herengracht。这家博物馆由伊福的女儿西格丽德(Sigrid)打理（是的，她在大学时曾写了一篇关于手袋历史的论文）。高高大门被漆成洋红色；原会议室的墙壁贴的是花布墙纸。尽管大多数展厅陈列着玻璃橱窗，但一个蛋黄色、带有深红郁金香碎花图案的柜子，有着新颖的后现代风格陈列箱，弯曲的柜腿像17世纪荷兰柜子的醉酒版。博物馆底层是一家漂亮的咖啡厅，提供可以外带的糖果，它们都用精小的纸制手袋包装。上面几层就是真正的博物馆了。
伊福买的第一个手袋（35年前去英格兰旅行时买的）是一个小巧的皮制手袋，它的龟甲薄片嵌以珍珠母花饰，是件德国货，年代大约在1820年。现在，这里有满满两层楼专门展示她的历史藏品，包括一件稀有的16世纪银框山羊皮手袋，它有18个小口袋，3个外袋，上面扣着花朵纽扣。这两层楼还分类展示18世纪扁平刺绣对装手袋的迷人范例，这种钱袋有一个带子，妇女可以将其系在自己腰间，也可以系在衬裙和裙子中间。（她们裙子内的缝隙给袋子留出了空间。）伊福自己最喜欢的是一款蛇皮手袋，它产自20世纪20年代的德国，像她第一个手袋一样，这款包的正面，用象牙雕刻了夏娃(Eve)摘苹果的形象。
但还有其它用丝绸和皮革、竹子和塑料、金属、象牙以及羽毛制成的手袋。几个瓮状新古典主义风格的可爱包包（法国，1820年）甚至是用纸浆制成的。还有用珠子制成的手袋，其中一款带有第一只到法国的长颈鹿形象；有些手袋非常讲究，只有放几枚硬币的空间；还有装梳子、口红、粉盒等必需品的手袋，有一款则是为装望远镜准备的。手袋由形形色色爬行动物的皮制成，其中也包括美洲鳗。有一款包的形状类似手风琴，另一个则像一个胶卷盒；也有香槟酒冷却器的形象，以及一个黑色夹包，它模仿了“诺曼底”号(S.S. Normandie)的形象，带有银制蒸汽烟囱纽扣和时髦的锚形装饰（法国，大约1935年）。这里还有朱迪思•利伯(Judith Lieber)设计的黑白“短袜”(Socks)，它因克林顿(Clinton)的宠物猫而得名，这是一款黄色天鹅绒Deux Cheveux。一个陈列柜装满了孩子们的袋子和背包，包括粉色的风车。这里满是大牌名字：Dolce & Gabbana、香奈儿、巴宝莉(Burberry)。
哦，还有一款爱马仕的凯莉包。最近在维多利亚阿尔伯特博物馆(Victoria and Albert Museum)的一次谈话中，西格丽德表示，手袋博物馆当时仅有的凯莉包是件赝品。一位听众立刻提出捐赠一个真品，并额外提供一款小巧的迪奥包。不断有人提供捐赠。类似的热情必须为下一季的购买行动留出空间啊。
Herengracht 573，阿姆斯特丹。电话：+31 (0)20-524 64 52；www.tassenmuseum.nl
译者/梁鸥
《生活时尚》
2007年8月31日 星期五
你曾认为芭芭拉•艾米尔•布莱克(Barbara Amiel Black)有手袋是件坏事，她的爱马仕(Hermès)Birkin包和凯莉包(Kelly)有两位数之多。这种现代苦恼使我们一看到带有Chloé、巴黎世家(Balenciaga)、迪奥(Dior)、威登(Vuitton)和香奈儿(Chanel)等标识的小背包、购物袋、包装袋和无带皮包，就充满欲望。结果，当我们将另一个特大号的华丽手包提回家时，却发现自己不断“膨胀”的衣橱已经塞得太满了。
然而，实际上，看到这篇文章的人或许不太知道荷兰古董商亨德里克耶•伊福(Hendrikje Ivo)，在过去35年中，她染上了一种严重的手袋瘾，以至于今年夏初在阿姆斯特丹开放了一个博物馆，专门展示她的藏品。
伊福说：“手袋是一个女人的秘密抽屉，”她试图解释自己的这种痴迷（这难以解释，但对我们大多数人而言，又是可以理解的）。“它总是与她如影随形。”
伊福向手袋博物馆Tassenmuseum捐赠了2000多个手袋，这么多移动抽屉哪怕对行动最隐秘的玛塔•哈里(Mata Hari)（电影《魔女玛塔》的主人公，是一位德国女间谍——译者注）式女人也足够了，但伊福还保留了另外五、六十个手袋供私人使用。这没什么。重要的是，当我们所有人都进入夏季戒瘾的心境时，伊福的做法不但给所有钟爱手袋的旅行者一颗消除内疚感的定心丸，还是一扇无价之窗，显示了非常现代的消费趋势（诚实地讲，对于在思索秋冬购物行动的所有人而言，这是个不错的回顾）。
这家博物馆是座双面开门的豪华建筑，17世纪这里曾是一家银行，建筑内部有原创的手绘顶棚，面朝阿姆斯特丹最美的运河之一——Herengracht。这家博物馆由伊福的女儿西格丽德(Sigrid)打理（是的，她在大学时曾写了一篇关于手袋历史的论文）。高高大门被漆成洋红色；原会议室的墙壁贴的是花布墙纸。尽管大多数展厅陈列着玻璃橱窗，但一个蛋黄色、带有深红郁金香碎花图案的柜子，有着新颖的后现代风格陈列箱，弯曲的柜腿像17世纪荷兰柜子的醉酒版。博物馆底层是一家漂亮的咖啡厅，提供可以外带的糖果，它们都用精小的纸制手袋包装。上面几层就是真正的博物馆了。
伊福买的第一个手袋（35年前去英格兰旅行时买的）是一个小巧的皮制手袋，它的龟甲薄片嵌以珍珠母花饰，是件德国货，年代大约在1820年。现在，这里有满满两层楼专门展示她的历史藏品，包括一件稀有的16世纪银框山羊皮手袋，它有18个小口袋，3个外袋，上面扣着花朵纽扣。这两层楼还分类展示18世纪扁平刺绣对装手袋的迷人范例，这种钱袋有一个带子，妇女可以将其系在自己腰间，也可以系在衬裙和裙子中间。（她们裙子内的缝隙给袋子留出了空间。）伊福自己最喜欢的是一款蛇皮手袋，它产自20世纪20年代的德国，像她第一个手袋一样，这款包的正面，用象牙雕刻了夏娃(Eve)摘苹果的形象。
但还有其它用丝绸和皮革、竹子和塑料、金属、象牙以及羽毛制成的手袋。几个瓮状新古典主义风格的可爱包包（法国，1820年）甚至是用纸浆制成的。还有用珠子制成的手袋，其中一款带有第一只到法国的长颈鹿形象；有些手袋非常讲究，只有放几枚硬币的空间；还有装梳子、口红、粉盒等必需品的手袋，有一款则是为装望远镜准备的。手袋由形形色色爬行动物的皮制成，其中也包括美洲鳗。有一款包的形状类似手风琴，另一个则像一个胶卷盒；也有香槟酒冷却器的形象，以及一个黑色夹包，它模仿了“诺曼底”号(S.S. Normandie)的形象，带有银制蒸汽烟囱纽扣和时髦的锚形装饰（法国，大约1935年）。这里还有朱迪思•利伯(Judith Lieber)设计的黑白“短袜”(Socks)，它因克林顿(Clinton)的宠物猫而得名，这是一款黄色天鹅绒Deux Cheveux。一个陈列柜装满了孩子们的袋子和背包，包括粉色的风车。这里满是大牌名字：Dolce & Gabbana、香奈儿、巴宝莉(Burberry)。
哦，还有一款爱马仕的凯莉包。最近在维多利亚阿尔伯特博物馆(Victoria and Albert Museum)的一次谈话中，西格丽德表示，手袋博物馆当时仅有的凯莉包是件赝品。一位听众立刻提出捐赠一个真品，并额外提供一款小巧的迪奥包。不断有人提供捐赠。类似的热情必须为下一季的购买行动留出空间啊。
Herengracht 573，阿姆斯特丹。电话：+31 (0)20-524 64 52；www.tassenmuseum.nl
译者/梁鸥
《生活时尚》
中国反垄断虚多实少
英国《金融时报》中文网财经编辑何禹欣
2007年8月31日 星期五
20年里不断重复讨论、修改、搁置经历的中国《反垄断法》，终于在8月30日下午，由中国人大常委会高票表决通过。新法将在一年后正式施行。与过去对外资小敲小打的部门规定不同，这部人大通过的正式法律，标志着改革开放30年来中国外资政策拐点的到来。
虽然中国立法者不断声称，这部旨在消除中国境内经济活动中垄断行为的法律，并不针对外资，也不会直接影响外资在中国的并购活动，但这部法律的通过，仍然引起了外国投资者的担心。
外界观察家们认为，跨国公司将是《反垄断法》的主要规制对象。这一判断的主要根据是，随着经济实力和外汇储备增长，中国已经不再像从前那样盲目需要外资了，因而要通过重订规则的方式，按自己需要选择引进外资。
中国方面的说法似乎也验证了这些外界观察家的猜测。“21世纪的中国和20世纪的中国不一样了，”一位主持《反垄断法》草案拟订的官员解释说，外资在中国也需要一个质量提高的过程。“没有很好的技术、更高的质量，外资来做什么呢？”
这一政策转向，重点体现在《反垄断法》提出对外资并购进行双重审查。符合条件的外资并购案不单会受到反垄断审查，还可能受到国家安全审查。按《反垄断法》规定，才通过不到一年的《关于外国投资者并购境内企业的规定》，“整个都要改。”在新并购规定里，外资在中国并购的审查条件会更加具体，“必须量化。”
更能说明《反垄断法》对外资政策指导力度的，是由它引发的对其他中国法律法规的修订。根据网站antitrustchina.com统计，反垄断法出台后，直接受到影响的法律法规则有12个：公司法类有8个，知识产权类3个和外贸领域1个。
获得更好的技术，引进更优质的投资，固然是中国改变外资政策的主要目的之一。但通过增强对在中国国内的外资的限制，更好地维护中国自己的跨国公司——大国企，尤其在海外的利益，则是《反垄断法》的另一个主要目的。对可能危及国家安全的外资并购或其他行为进行国家安全审查，集中地体现了这一诉求。
从内部来看，加入WTO后外资在中国的并购日益活跃。一个常被援引的数据是，2000年，并购额只占中国FDI（外商直接投资）额的5.5%，2004年已经增加一倍，达到11%，2005年又增加一倍，达到20%左右。虽然这一比例远低于并购在全球FDI中过半的比重，跨国公司却越来越频繁地受到中国媒体和公众的质疑。无论去年的徐工收购还是今年的娃哈哈中外股东争吵，都被上升到了反对外资产业垄断的高度。就在2006年一年里，中国出台了3个涉及加强外资并购管理的政策规定。
更重要的是，被称为“走出去”的中国大国企的海外并购和投资活动已经铺开，并在以更大的规模和力度推进。早在2005年3月，中国中央直属企业的境外资产总额便达到6299亿元。截至2006年底，中国累计的非金融类FDI已超过730亿美元。最新消息表明，掌握2000亿美元的中国国家外汇投资公司准备通过16家央企展开境外投资。今年以来，中国已经进行了两笔金额都在30亿美元的境外股权投资。
然而中国的海外并购活动在发达市场一直容易受到非经济因素左右。尤其自今年以来，“中国制造”的安全问题在全球范围内被拔高到一个危险的水平，中国跨国公司们出海的风险也随之加大。“西方国家两面三刀，我们已经很看得清楚了。”一位参与《垄断法》的中国法律专家表示，最近中国企业的一个海外并购行动又将横遭安全审查，而“中国还没有这个制度”——现在要以新法为契机，把对并购的整个审查制度建立起来。一位欧洲法律人士也认为，某种程度上，《反垄断法》可以看成是中国对两年前中海油收购美国优尼科石油公司失败的一个回应。
虽然立意甚高，《反垄断法》在中国到底能达到什么样的效果，令人存疑。就法条本身而言，留待解释空间太大，可操作性很差。中国美国商会认为，新法亟需得到多种配套法规的阐释，其中便包含了对交易进行竞争和国家安全审查的程序，和美国尤其关心的对滥用知识产权如何定义及惩处。一位中国法律专家指出，中国已具备最完备的知识产权法和环境保护法，但执行效果却聊胜于无。
但对中国外资政策变化的预期，短期内反而可能加速外资在中国的并购活动。
2007年8月31日 星期五
20年里不断重复讨论、修改、搁置经历的中国《反垄断法》，终于在8月30日下午，由中国人大常委会高票表决通过。新法将在一年后正式施行。与过去对外资小敲小打的部门规定不同，这部人大通过的正式法律，标志着改革开放30年来中国外资政策拐点的到来。
虽然中国立法者不断声称，这部旨在消除中国境内经济活动中垄断行为的法律，并不针对外资，也不会直接影响外资在中国的并购活动，但这部法律的通过，仍然引起了外国投资者的担心。
外界观察家们认为，跨国公司将是《反垄断法》的主要规制对象。这一判断的主要根据是，随着经济实力和外汇储备增长，中国已经不再像从前那样盲目需要外资了，因而要通过重订规则的方式，按自己需要选择引进外资。
中国方面的说法似乎也验证了这些外界观察家的猜测。“21世纪的中国和20世纪的中国不一样了，”一位主持《反垄断法》草案拟订的官员解释说，外资在中国也需要一个质量提高的过程。“没有很好的技术、更高的质量，外资来做什么呢？”
这一政策转向，重点体现在《反垄断法》提出对外资并购进行双重审查。符合条件的外资并购案不单会受到反垄断审查，还可能受到国家安全审查。按《反垄断法》规定，才通过不到一年的《关于外国投资者并购境内企业的规定》，“整个都要改。”在新并购规定里，外资在中国并购的审查条件会更加具体，“必须量化。”
更能说明《反垄断法》对外资政策指导力度的，是由它引发的对其他中国法律法规的修订。根据网站antitrustchina.com统计，反垄断法出台后，直接受到影响的法律法规则有12个：公司法类有8个，知识产权类3个和外贸领域1个。
获得更好的技术，引进更优质的投资，固然是中国改变外资政策的主要目的之一。但通过增强对在中国国内的外资的限制，更好地维护中国自己的跨国公司——大国企，尤其在海外的利益，则是《反垄断法》的另一个主要目的。对可能危及国家安全的外资并购或其他行为进行国家安全审查，集中地体现了这一诉求。
从内部来看，加入WTO后外资在中国的并购日益活跃。一个常被援引的数据是，2000年，并购额只占中国FDI（外商直接投资）额的5.5%，2004年已经增加一倍，达到11%，2005年又增加一倍，达到20%左右。虽然这一比例远低于并购在全球FDI中过半的比重，跨国公司却越来越频繁地受到中国媒体和公众的质疑。无论去年的徐工收购还是今年的娃哈哈中外股东争吵，都被上升到了反对外资产业垄断的高度。就在2006年一年里，中国出台了3个涉及加强外资并购管理的政策规定。
更重要的是，被称为“走出去”的中国大国企的海外并购和投资活动已经铺开，并在以更大的规模和力度推进。早在2005年3月，中国中央直属企业的境外资产总额便达到6299亿元。截至2006年底，中国累计的非金融类FDI已超过730亿美元。最新消息表明，掌握2000亿美元的中国国家外汇投资公司准备通过16家央企展开境外投资。今年以来，中国已经进行了两笔金额都在30亿美元的境外股权投资。
然而中国的海外并购活动在发达市场一直容易受到非经济因素左右。尤其自今年以来，“中国制造”的安全问题在全球范围内被拔高到一个危险的水平，中国跨国公司们出海的风险也随之加大。“西方国家两面三刀，我们已经很看得清楚了。”一位参与《垄断法》的中国法律专家表示，最近中国企业的一个海外并购行动又将横遭安全审查，而“中国还没有这个制度”——现在要以新法为契机，把对并购的整个审查制度建立起来。一位欧洲法律人士也认为，某种程度上，《反垄断法》可以看成是中国对两年前中海油收购美国优尼科石油公司失败的一个回应。
虽然立意甚高，《反垄断法》在中国到底能达到什么样的效果，令人存疑。就法条本身而言，留待解释空间太大，可操作性很差。中国美国商会认为，新法亟需得到多种配套法规的阐释，其中便包含了对交易进行竞争和国家安全审查的程序，和美国尤其关心的对滥用知识产权如何定义及惩处。一位中国法律专家指出，中国已具备最完备的知识产权法和环境保护法，但执行效果却聊胜于无。
但对中国外资政策变化的预期，短期内反而可能加速外资在中国的并购活动。
订阅：
博文 (Atom)